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The author’s objective in this dissertation is to explore the relationship between the 
“new wars” thesis and the state, showing that “new wars” have an impact on the state’s 
core structure, and vice versa. Accordingly, it is our view the state has an essential input 
in “new wars”. Our central question is: what type of state is more likely to struggle with 
“new wars”? The hypothesis advances that weak or failed states offer the best 
conditions and circumstances for “new wars” to develop, primarily because “new wars” 
affect and rely on the erosion, or complete elimination, of two core elements of the 
state: legitimacy and the monopoly of force. Although several authors are considered, 
the main source for information and analyses is Mary Kaldor for being one of the 
central contributors to the elaboration and defense of the “new wars” thesis: this will be 
discussed as well.   
 The dissertation is organized into three chapters which guide the reader through the 
argument. This dissertation starts with an explanation of what “new wars” are; followed 
by a reflection on the state- what composes a state, the importance of legitimacy and 
upholding the monopoly of force, the problem of weak and failed states-; finally 
tackling the case study of the Bosnian-Herzegovina war, to offer a more practical 
insight. The motivation to pursue this dissertation surges from the curiosity to find out if 
“new wars” can depict contemporary warfare reality. If it does, it will be helpful to 
understand it in order to solve present conflicts.  In conclusion the hypothesis, according 
to this research, is seen as accurate establishing that failed and weak states are primary 
incubators for “new wars” and that the erosion of the core elements of the state are at 
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“Political ability: It is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and 
next year. And to have the ability afterward to explain why it didn’t happen” 
Winston Churchill 
War has walked hand-in-hand with human evolution. From medieval times to the 
creation of the modern state, the art of war has played a central role in shaping politics. 
Students of history unavoidably battle to understand war and its consequences. Those 
who strive for peace and pursue peace studies find they need to comprehend war in 
order to recognize peace. The nature of warfare is far from stagnant. With the help of 
industrialization, urbanization, technological advancement, expanding education, states, 
organizations and people have restructured warfare and have found themselves reshaped 
in return. War is dependent on the historical context that envelops it, so academics such 
as Mary Kaldor, Herfried Münkler and Martin Van Creveld have emphasized that the 
characteristics that contour our world today are very different from the context that 
surrounded the Clausewitz era or World Wars One and Two.  
Accordingly, classical description of warfare needs adjusting and Kaldor introduces the 
“new wars” thesis as a more accurate depiction of its current nature. Kaldor’s concept 
attempts to demonstrate that we are no longer dealing with ‘old wars’ and the character 
of warfare has undergone transformations. More than a theoretical impact, the “new 
wars” concept has practical implications, because to address modern-day conflicts 
effectively, we must first understand their structure and motivations. Kaldor depicts 
“new wars” as being fought by combinations of state and non-state actors and is usually 




 One key variable which needs to be emphasizing is the state. If the state is weak by 
lacking a legitimate source of authority or a solid monopoly of force, the tendency for 
wars to possess the characteristics of “new wars” increases. Regardless of the accuracy 
of its academic definition – many consider that “new wars” aren’t precisely new – it 
seems clear that there are novel realities that surround and tend to define contemporary 
conflicts. This distinctiveness of “new wars” is a consequence of general factors such as 
increased globalization, the rapid technological progress and the increased competition 
the state faces, from the growing influence of non-state actors, on the international 
stage. The state’s role in addressing, monitoring and resolving “new wars” is 
indispensable, because the structure of these conflicts relies greatly on the absence of a 
centralized authority, which allows new players to gain easy access to the monopoly of 
force and fund themselves by direct access to global markets.  
The aim of this dissertation is to consider the relationship between “new wars” and the 
state. The state is intrinsically coupled with legitimacy, the maintenance of the 
monopoly of force and ensuring security. Accordingly, one main question came up 
during our research: What type of state is more likely to struggle with “new wars”? The 
hypothesis being that weak or failed states offer the most fruitful ground for “new wars” 
to sprout and be nurtured, and that “new wars” disrupt the basic elements of the state – 
legitimacy and the monopoly of force– consequently breaking down the guarantee of 
security. In this sense it is also interesting to consider how “new wars” affect the 
defining elements of the state according to Max Weber.  
For Kaldor, “new wars” are about state disintegration, as throughout their duration the 
state is further incapacitated. By going unsolved, “new wars” continue to weaken the 




of “new wars” is their global and regional consequences, ongoing conflicts can 
destabilize international security. This dissertation aspires to join the academic debate 
on how “new wars” foster state instability, and how tremulous states make easy targets. 
To give the dissertation a more practical side, the Bosnia-Herzegovina war will be 
individually considered, as it can be seen as an example of “new wars”. Throughout this 
reflection, Kaldor’s work, New and Old Wars(2012), will be a primary reference, 
because she is a leading author and defender of the “new wars” thesis; offering clear cut 
arguments.  
It seems vital to try to further the academic debate seeking to comprehend contemporary 
conflicts. Following a perspective of positive peace, where conflict can never be 
abolished, only transformed by peaceful means, there is no option but to deal with 
conflicts and find effective ways of facing them when they rise and explode. Each 
conflict takes its own shape and requires specific actions, but central common 
characteristics can be distinguished. Understanding those characteristics and their 
consequences can have the practical effect of helping to develop more effective conflict-
resolution strategies. The motivation to develop this dissertation arose from the 
curiosity as to whether the “new wars” perspective does depict contemporary reality and 
can offer future solutions. Moreover, given that the international order is dynamic and 
constantly evolving, we find ourselves at a time when the state’s role is being 
reinterpreted.  If contemporary conflicts fit the “new wars” reality, then the state is at 
the center of the question. New paradigms always arise to refute old ones, and the “new 
wars” expression has surfaced to compete with the classical warfare narrative, but the 
question remains: does it accurately interpret contemporary reality? Furthermore, what 




The dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first will introduce the characteristics 
of “new wars”, and reflect on the progress of warfare. The second will introduce Max 
Weber’s definition of the state, and will present the relevance and significance of 
legitimacy and the monopoly of force in upholding a viable state. The last will explore 
the case study of the Bosnia- Herzegovina war, in order to illustrate a practical example 
of “new wars”. Our goal is to explain and debate what the “new wars” thesis embodies 
and what characteristics differ from classical warfare; as well as to reflect upon its 
meaning in our world (dis)order.  This equally implies focusing on the state, as the 
reader becomes aware of the relationship between legitimacy and security that is 
imprinted on its structure. The project will be concise, but offer extensive information 
on the “new wars” subject, hopefully adding to the academic debate by motivating 











Chapter I: Characterizing “New Wars”  
“War  is Peace” 
George Orwell, 1984 
1.1-Contrasting the Concept of ´Old Wars’ and How it Differs from “New Wars” 
The theory behind war has always consumed academics as they attempt to mold and 
define its undomesticated nature.  If defining classical warfare wasn’t hard enough, now 
academics are faced with the possibility of having to tackle “new wars”.  
Before addressing the subject of ‘old wars’ as Kaldor describes them, it is important to 
introduce Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who wrote On War (published after his 
death), after the Napoleonic wars. Although the focus of this dissertation is not to 
determine the validity of Clausewitz’s arguments, On War offers important insight 
enduring through time and circumstances. As Colin S. Gray emphasizes in War, Peace 
and International Relations, Clausewitz aimed to explore and describe the nature of war 
and educate readers, rather than to develop a how-to guide for warfare. Like any book 
of this magnitude, On War, is not infallible. Some “new wars” theorists, such as Van 
Creveld, have come to deem Clausewitz, On War, obsolete, and Kaldor also views “new 
wars” in a ‘post-Clausewitzean’ light.
1
 Clausewitz had a strong military background 
having joined the Prussian army in the 34
th
 Infantry Regiment in 1792, and the totality 
of his military experience was marked by the opposition to revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France: the Napoleonic Wars deeply altered the perception of warfare in 
Europe. Having experience combat, Clausewitz was determined to highlight a practical 
                                                          
1 Another ardent critic of the limitations of On War is John Keegan, who in A History of Warfare argues Clausewitz’s 
work is very limited by his personal experiences and is highly influenced by the cultural environment of his time, 
with a vision constricted by two institutions, the state and the regiment. Keegan actually compares Clausewitz to 
Marx, and attributes him ideological responsibility for the outbreak of World War I. This seems extreme. Naturally, 
like any author, Clausewitz was influenced by his cultural, social and political environment, but this does not render 




side to On War. It is worth noting that Clausewitz was influenced by the German 
Enlightenment which is characterized by its Romanticism; as such he aimed at 
rationalizing and humanizing warfare. Furthermore Clausewitz was never fully satisfied 
by his work but was never able to complete his re-writes.   
Clausewitz addresses the two aspects of war: objective (the nature of war) and 
subjective (the character of war). Gray defends the relevance of Clausewitz’s work by 
using this division and stating that “there are no old wars or new wars, at least not with 
respect to their nature. But assuredly the character of warfare periodically is 
transformed by socio-cultural, political and technological change” (Gray, 2008:227), 
and so Clausewitz’s rhetoric is relevant to understanding the nature of war even today.  
Gray explains that at the heart of the ideas about the nature of war lies the trinity of 
violence: “enmity and passion, chance and opportunity, and reason; the climate of war, 
comprising ‘danger, exertion, uncertainty, and, chance; and friction…” (Gray, 
2008:24)
2
.  By talking about friction Clausewitz wanted to emphasize the difference 
between real war and “war on paper” (Clausewitz, 1997:67), which is an important 
aspect when relating theory with practice, and is extremely relevant for all studies of 
peace, war and conflict resolution. Reality does not always equate with theory, and 
theory might not mirror reality. Perhaps the best center of gravity in “new wars” is the 
reconstruction of order; so in order to successfully ‘defeat the enemy’, the state has to 
regain control – a very difficult task. The legitimacy of Clausewitz’s arguments are not 
the main concern of this analysis, which takes it for granted that Clausewitz, On War,  
remains a relevant analytical tool and should not be considered obsolete; however, 
                                                          
2 This trinity remains controversial because it associates passion with the people, chance and creativity with the army, 
including the commander of the army, and reason with the government. These direct associations would limit 




given the different circumstances in which the book was written, some reflections can 
no longer be directly applied to today’s conflict dynamic.   
For Kaldor ‘old wars’ are predominantly a European phenomenon and intrinsically 
related to the evolution of the modern state. Michael Howard, in The Invention of 
Peace, describes the Medieval European geographic area as extremely bellicose. It was 
molded by warrior societies which developed due to the progress of military technology 
and the increase in the financial cost of war, and which in return were also related with 
the development of the social order. These variables accompanied the growth of Europe, 
so from the start we can observe war and social order as two phenomenons that interact 
and influence one another. For Howard, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia established a 
change in the world order, as it consolidated the state’s position as the guardian of 
domestic order and the “…legitimiser of external war.” (Howard, 2000:16) At the time, 
kings had absolute sovereignty. Consequently, by the eighteenth century the concept of 
international order was associated with the ‘balance of powers’; “a balance that might 
have to be constantly adjusted by wars” (Howard, 2000:24). This is the first attempt to 
rationalize war as a method for preserving state powers. As Kaldor points out, the 
evolution of the modern state required a process of monopolization of violence, as 
mercenary armies were replaced by standing armies. In medieval times the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello
3
 derived from papal authority; but Van Creveld explains, under 
the modern state:  
“to distinguish war from mere crime, it was defined as something waged by 
sovereign states and by them alone. Soldiers were defined as personnel licensed 
to engage in armed violence on behalf of the state…. The civilian population 
                                                          
3“ Jus ad bellum refere-se ao princípio de se envolver em uma guerra por uma causa  justa, como a autodefesa. Por 
outro lado, o jus in bello refere-se ao princípio de se lutar uma guerra de maneira justa e, por isso, engloba padrões de 
proporcionalidade e distinções entre civis e combatentes.” (Antoine A. Bouvier, Direito Internacional Humanitário e 




was supposed to be left alone, ‘military necessity’ permitting.” (Creveld, 
1991:40) 
 
In order to wage war externally it was necessary for the domestic order to be regulated,  
Kaldor characterizes the eighteenth century as a time of clear distinctions, between 
private and public, civilian and military, and legitimate bearer of arms and civilians or 
criminals. For Howard, the Enlightenment marked a critical period in the emergence of 
nation-states; as Europe approached World War I, “war was becoming too serious a 
business…” (Howard, 2000: 48), evolving into a positive science more than a ’romantic 
adventure’ (Howard, 2000:52). The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were 
important landmarks in the construction of the international order, but they soon 
replaced their aims of preventing war with concerns about making it more humane. The 
distinctions that Kaldor enumerated concerning the eighteenth century break down in an 
environment of Total War
4
.  During World War II the term ‘genocide’
5
 invaded the 
international stage, shattering the separation between military and civilians. Howard 
illustrates that, “civilian populations, which at the beginning of the century had been 
regarded as reservoirs of military manpower and in its middle years as producers of the 
tools of war, were now no more than hostages”(Howard, 2000: 78).  In Total War the 
state directs all its domestic sectors towards the war effort. The application of Total War 
                                                          
4  Baylis and Smith, in The Globalization of World Politics, define total war: “a term given to the twentieth century’s 
two world wars to denote not only their global scale but also the combatant’s pursuit of their opponents’ 
‘unconditional surrender’ ( a phrase particularly associated with the Western allies in the Second World War). Total 
War also signifies the mobilization of whole populations – including women into factory work and in auxiliary civil 
defense units, and as paramilitaries and paramedics – as part of total call-up of all able-bodies citizens in pursuit of 
victory”(Baylis and Smith, 2005:87) 
5According to Article 2 of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: “genocide 
means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such:  (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.” (Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,1948).  For more information regarding the debate surrounding the definition of Genocide consult United 




led to the internal collapse of the states; as Howards illustrates “now it was the change 
in the nature of war that transformed the societies who fought it” (Howard 2000: 58).  
The justification for going to war in the eighteenth century, Kaldor emphasizes, was 
mostly prompted by state interests. In World War I, state interests and patriotism 
continued to play a vital role, but after the war and the devastating consequences for the 
population, it seems greater ideological incentives were needed to venture onto 
battlefields.  Kaldor points out that in World War II the Allies believed they were 
entering a war against evil, Nazism, and were fighting to protect their own way of life: 
Democracy. Consequently, Kaldor depicts, the Cold War as a “…war of the 
imagination…” (Kaldor, 2012: 28) claiming actual wars occurred in specific situations, 
such as the Americans in Vietnam and the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. There 
was a growing concern with the illegitimacy of war and with waging war in exceptional 
circumstances, which is still mirrored today. As Kaldor references: “nowadays, it does 
seem to have become widely accepted that the use of force is only justifiable either in 
self-defense or if it is sanctioned by the international community – in particular, The 
UN Security Council” (Kaldor, 2012:29). The United Nations rules regarding the right 
to war, illustrate how states still take upon themselves the responsibility to monitor 
warfare, and remain vital, in shaping the perception and acceptance of war. This point is 
also reflected in Kaldor’s observation that since World War I the importance of 
alliances has grown, using the European case as an example and postulating that: “…at 
least in Western Europe, what was effectively a transnational civil society was extended 
to a group of nations” (Kaldor, 2012:30). By the end of the 20
th
 Century it seemed states 
were losing the ability to fight wars unilaterally, and Kaldor references NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact as examples of how alliances became rigidified and how the multilateral 




To Kaldor, the idea that the distinctions between public and private, military and civil 
and internal and external are breaking down: “…calls into question the distinction 
between war and peace itself” (Kaldor, 2012: 31) Kaldor uses George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four slogan ‘War Is Peace’ to reference the Cold War as an example of 
a permanent war which incorporated a large psychological dimension, especially in 
Western Europe.
6
 However Kaldor is quick to point out that within the Cold War grand 
design, various wars were fought that Kaldor calls “…irregular, informal wars…” 
(Kaldor, 2012:31), mostly because they did not fit into the European ‘old wars’ 
spectrum. Wars such as wartime resistance movements and guerrilla warfare are for 
Kaldor the first representations of an emerging form of warfare, which reflected a 
emerging bellicosity, where:  “the actors, techniques and counter-techniques which 
emerged out of the cracks of modern warfare were to provide the basis for new ways of 
socially organizing violence” (Kaldor, 2012: 31).  
Various forms of warfare-related terminology emerged throughout the history of 
warfare to try and define specific dynamics of violent conflict; in addition to terms such 
as ‘old wars’, we have “civil war”, “insurgency”, “guerrilla war”, “wars of national 
liberation” to name a few. More recently, new expressions have been constructed, 
including Colonel John Boyd’s “fourth-generation warfare”, which is characterized by 
the elimination of the distinction between war and peace and by not attempting to gain 
victory by defeating the enemies forces, but “instead via networks, it directly attacks the 
minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will” (Hoffman and 
Weiss, 2006:55); and Donald Snow’s use of “uncivil wars” to illustrate “…armed 
practices that appear to be devoid of explicit political meaning” (Hoffman and Weiss, 
                                                          
6 The society depicted in Orwell’s novel was a dystopia where the concept of war and peace morphed into one single 
distorted permanent state of humanity. Distancing itself from ‘old wars’ and ‘new wars’ Orwell’s interpretation of a 




2006: 55). Kaldor’s term “new wars”, which is referenced by authors such as Mark 
Duffield and Münkler, has become one of the most popular contemporary terms. 
However, the fact is that amid so many definitions, understanding warfare is becoming 
more complex. The following Tables were constructed, to offer a simplified theoretical 
comparison of ‘old wars’ and “new wars”: 




 Century- Conventional ‘old wars’ 20
th
 Century Wars-  Evolution of Conventional ‘Old 
wars’ 
Standing armies; distinction between public and private; 
distinction between internal and external; distinction 
between the economic and the political; distinction 
between civil and military;  distinction between legitimate 
bearer of arms and civilians or criminals; 
 
Breakdown of clear distinctions; Total War 
Motivated primarily by state interests  Additional ethnic and ideological motivations; 
introduction of the term ‘Genocide’ 
Calls upon patriotism Requires deeper motivations for population to go to 
war- fighting for Democracy, International order, 
International security. 
Mostly fought unilaterally Wars increasingly fought multilaterally; increased 
importance of Alliances 
Casualties primarily combatants  Dramatic increase in civilian casualties 
Minimal propaganda, given the limitations of media and 
the lack of technological resources.  
Increase in the use of the ‘propaganda machine’ due to 
the progress made in the Media dimension and the 
development of communication technology 
Conventional weapons are used Development of weaponry and military technology 
“New Wars” 
Global Dimension of War: Breakdown of state borders as delimitations of war, and consequently war also becomes 
borderless; there are less wars between countries and an increase in conflicts and warfare within state borders.  
Permanent State of War: Violence takes on a dormant manifestation, but then explodes in sudden intense bursts; 
conflicts become more complex. 
Low Intensity Conflict 
Multitude of Actors: States, international organizations, private actors such as local warlords, guerilla groups, 
mercenaries, private security companies and organized crime agents; increase in multilateral interventions; which also 
translates into a plurality of overlapping interests. 
Economic Motivations: Agents gain great financial benefits from the maintenance of a war environment; globalization 
opens up new market opportunities for private agents. 
Civilians as Direct Military Targets: High civilian casualties as the distinction between combatant and non-combatant 
blurs; increase in child soldiers; continuous disregard for human rights and International Humanitarian Law; conflicts 
are fought in the midst of the population. 
Impact of Emergent  New Military and Communication Technology 
Greater Media Coverage and Humanitarian Intervention- gaining public support to enter into military 
confrontations or manipulating public opinion has increased in importance; people are more interested in being 





Kaldor, in an interview conducted by Alan Johnson, depicts “new wars” as being “… 
fought by combinations of state and non-state actors, and (…) usually (…) not for 
reasons of state or ideology, but for identity. Battle is rare and most violence is directed 
against civilians…”. Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, in Sword & Salve, explain 
that the departure from the ‘old wars’ scheme began in the “new wars” of the 1990s, 
“…where most battleground states have minimal power, and often even that is 
contested by internal armed opposition movements that pay no attention to 
internationally recognized borders. Many have central governments whose sole 
existence takes the form of UN membership and control of the capital or the 
main export industries…In sum, all illustrates a departure from the conventions 
of sovereign states in terms of authoritative control over populations and 
resources.” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:60) 
 
Critics, of the “new wars” concept, tend to focus on pointing out that many of the 
characteristic of “new wars” can be found at some time or another during warfare 
history, which is a valid argument.  The use of the word “new” can be misleading and 
hazardous. However, as Hoffman and Weiss acknowledge: “… recent wars have 
unusual elements that make them particularly dangerous and challenging for the 
inhabitants of afflicted areas, as well as for outsiders who come to the rescue” (Hoffman 
and Weiss, 2006:6). Hoffman and Weiss favor the term “changed”, because rather than 
new elements having materialized: 
“…elements thought extinct or tangential have come to the fore or been 
combined in ways that were previously unremarkable or unknown. Hence, 
change is quantitatively significant or the elements are combined in such 
previously unfamiliar ways that many of the current generation of wars can be 





“New wars” are marked by decentralization, unlimited violence and the absence of 
guidelines. In our view rather than focusing on establishing whether “new wars” are in 
fact new, it is important to understand the qualities that structure “new wars” in order to 
address them effectively. The role of the state has changed, there are new players, 
globalization has opened up markets, facilitating economic funding, conflicts are 
increasingly related to identity politics, and civilians have become a central target.  As a 
consequence, “new wars” surpass geographic borders, heightening the urgency of 
dealing with this type of conflict as effectively and swiftly as possible. Beyond the 
theoretical implications, understanding the dynamics of “new wars” has practical 
implications
7
. Furthermore, Hoffman and Weiss emphasize the importance of the “s” 
added to the word “war”, which illustrates “…the multiplicity of realities, even within a 
single armed conflict, because of the differences in violence, political interests, and 
economic activity that vary by region and over time” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:6). 
They warn that the same conflict can incorporate various wars, so perception becomes 
critical (consult Table 1.A in appendix for a summary of examples of “new wars” and 
their elements). Although each case has to be tackled individually, certain patterns can 
be established, namely the importance of state-building. In this case, we consider Mark 
Duffield’s, following remarks, in Global Governance and the New Wars, particularly 
important because they sum up how the security framework has been altered: 
 
                                                          
7 Colin S. Gray enumerates a series of practical principles of grand-strategy that should be adopted when dealing with 
counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism: “(1) The civilian, not the military, authorities must be in overall 
charge;(2) There must be unity of command and therefore of effort over civilian and military authorities;(3) the 
people have to be protected;(4) the regular belligerent must behave lawfully;(5) intelligence is king;(6) take ideology 
seriously;(7) the irregular enemy is not the target in COIN; the minds of the people are the zone of strategic and 
political decision;(8) cultural understanding is highly desirable, even essential;(9) deny the irregular enemy 





“conventional views on the causes of the new wars usually hinge upon their arising 
from a developmental malaise of poverty, resource competition and weak or predatory 
institutions. The links between these wars and international crime and terrorism are also 
increasingly drawn. Not only have the politics of development been radicalized to 
address this situation but, importantly, it reflects a new security framework within 
which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous. This framework is 
different from that of the Cold War when the threat of massive interstate conflict 
prevailed. The question of security has almost gone full circle: from being concerned 
with the biggest economies and war machines in the world to an interest in some of its 
smallest” (Duffield, 2001:16) 
 
1.2-Delimitation, Duration and Area of Influence of “New Wars” 
The locus of war has gradually morphed and “new wars” are no longer confined to state 
borders or outlined by a specific time frame. An immediate consequence of this change 
is that conflicts acquire a global and regional dimension. Although one can see a distinct 
increase in intrastate as opposed to interstate wars, as shown by the 2011 Conflict 
Barometer report, which recorded 301 intrastate conflicts versus 87 inter-state conflicts, 
their radius of influence has expanded with local, regional and global consequences 
(consult constructed  Table 1.B and Graph 1.C in appendix). Hoffman and Weiss 
highlight that in the 1990’s, 94% of wars were civil, citing conflicts such as the regional 
wars in Western and Central Africa (Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan) and central Asia 
(Afghanistan, Kashmir), and growing unrest in South America (Colombia, Peru, 
Bolivia) to illustrate the degrees of fragmentation (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:60). 
Concluding that wars are no longer framed by conventional borders, “instead, violence 
gravitates towards resources and opportunities for which borders are meaningless” 
(Hoffman and Weiss, 2006: 60). Münkler, in his article The Wars of the 21
st
 Century, 
observes that the conventional term ‘civil wars’ does not fully grasp the present state of 





“… the boundaries drawn by the states no longer play a role…It is characterized 
by a constant switching of friends and foes and by a breakdown of the 
institutional authorities (such as the military and the police) responsible for 
ordering and having recourse to the use of force.” (Münkler, 2003: 21) 
 
Thus, “new wars” seem to be progressively related to the disintegration of the state’s 
monopoly of war. When the state held the monopoly of force, fighting was 
concentrated; there was an identifiable enemy and  wars had an official beginning and 
end. World War I and II are model examples of how wars between states were 
centralized. On the contrary, “new wars” are marked by the dispersion of forces, where 
it is increasingly hard to identify a “time or place where all threads converge and a 
decisive result is sought” (Münkler, 2005:12). These wars tend to fall within the 
guerrilla warfare strategy and follow the lines of Mao Tse-tung’s principle of 
‘protracted warfare’. Accordingly, what could be called weaker players, in terms of 
technological and military capability, become prominent and have a greater possibility 
of overpowering stronger adversaries. By adopting a defensive strategy the conflict can 
be prolonged intermittently into a “long war of endurance” (Münkler, 2003: 9) with no 
clear end or beginning. Münkler emphasizes that most of the time physical 
confrontation recognizable as war isn’t even present. Violence takes on a dormant 
manifestation, but then explodes in sudden bursts of intensive violence, as if to reassure 
us it still subsists. However, Mao still served as a unifying leader who had a specific 
goal, and ultimately did want a resolution to war. Nowadays some actors seem 
determined to challenge the hypothesis that war cannot last forever. Münkler warns that 
Mao’s defensive strategy is being used to guarantee the self-preservation of “new wars” 




achieve because, “where there is no state executive powerful enough to impose the will 
of the majority, the ones who decide on war or peace are those most prepared to resort 
to violence. They hold the initiative and impose their will on everyone else” (Münkler, 
2005:13). On the other hand, Duffield recognizes a merging of war and peace and a 
blurring of the legal and illegal.  
The consequences of “new wars” surpass through geographical borders, Kaldor 
compares them to a virus (Johnson, 2007:18), making them very hard to contain, and 
predicts that war can no longer be contained geographically. Hoffman and Weiss note 
that “…new wars are fought locally (in neighborhoods, villages, and other subnational 
units), even if modern technologies make external connections easy” (Hoffman and 
Weiss,2006:60), but the consequences of these conflict go beyond the realm of fighting 
into regional and global dimensions. Phenomena such population displacement, refugee 
flows and criminal networks increase the transborder nature of wars. Refugee camps are 
mounted in neighboring countries, straining their economic and governmental 
structures, and can become targets for both sides
8
. Criminal Networks propagate drugs, 
arms and human trafficking and money laundering in countries all over the world
9
.  The 
way new wars diffuse their influence globally results in new security concerns, as 
Kalevi J. Holsti warns:  
“the major problem of the contemporary society of states is no longer 
aggression, conquest and the obliteration of states. It is, rather, the collapse of 
states, humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of local 
populations, civil wars of various types, and international terrorist 
organizations.” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:64) 
                                                          
8 To illustrate this Münkler cites, “ …the Turkish state’s war on underground Kurdish organizations, the Israeli 
operations in Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the wars in West Africa, the frontier conflicts between 
Somalia and Ethiopia, and the civil wars in Chad or Sudan and, most especially, Congo or Angola” (Herfried, 2005: 
89) 
9 Moisés Naím, in his article “The Five Wars of Globalization”, highlights how global criminal networks “defy 
traditional notions of sovereignty” and emphasizes “Al Qaeda’s members have passports and nationalities – and often 




1.3-“New Wars” Agents: States, Organizations and Individuals 
Locally, the vacuum left by the dissolution of the state’s monopoly of force is filled by a 
multitude of new actors, who indisputably impose daunting security implications. War 
is now an open field for private actors, such as local warlords, guerilla groups, 
mercenaries and organized crime players, who, have autonomous power and diverging 
interests, which at times are better serviced by sustaining the war. Although non-state 
actors (NSAs) have always played a significant part in warfare, Hoffman and Weiss 
highlight two ways in which their overall significance has changed: 
“first, some are in a more prominent position to wage war in an international 
order principally based on states, certainly since its consolidation as a system in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Second, some are predominant in 
responding to war, especially IGOs and NGOs…” (Hoffman and Weiss, 
2006:57) 
 
The authority of NSAs has not only increased in the international realm. Many NSAs 
have become dominant local players by supplying local social services to the 
population, at times usurping the role of the state. To describe this occurrence Stephen 
Stedman and Fred Tanner go to the extent of using the term “pseudo-states”, “…to 
denote crafty belligerents that manipulate the presence of refugees to attract and exploit 
humanitarian resources for their political agendas” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:65). 
Hoffman and Weiss cite two examples of the NSAs movement: the Sudanese Liberation 
Army, which acquired its status as part of the government in 2004, by gradually 
increasing its local legitimacy and authority by being in command of access and aid 
distribution; and, also portraying the dual aspect of international and local influence, 
Hezbollah – a movement that acquired a negative connotation worldwide, but locally 




The vacuum that NSAs come to fill often gives them a primary-agent role in conflicts, 
making them a required presence during negotiations, which makes the conflict-
resolution process more difficult: instead of dealing with the demands of one agent, 
government agencies and other states have to untangle a complex web of diverse needs. 
 Hoffman and Weiss enumerate three main categories of NSAs groups. First, armed 
belligerents who privatize the use of force by having autonomous military and political 
power that is not subordinate to the state and whose political power “…rests firmly on 
persistent insecurity, fear, and division. They seek not to establish legitimate political 
order but to provide protection primarily for security or political payoffs and economic 
gains” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:66), reflecting a predatory personality. Second, those 
whose economic interests are fulfilled by violence, making them advocates for the 
maintenance of conflict. These ‘war merchants’ engage in profitable activities such as 
“…driving up food prices and manipulating markets…pirating; and trafficking in arms, 
people, drugs and toxic wastes” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:67). The third group 
includes agents that blend military and economic agendas. This is where Hoffman and 
Weiss classify private military companies (PMCs), while being careful to highlight the 
distinction between them and mercenaries. To profile mercenaries, Hoffman and Weiss 
use former British soldier “Mad Mike” Hoare and ex-French-military Bob Denard as 
examples. The firm Executive Outcomes (EO) is a commonly cited example: “in 
Angola from 1993 to 1995, EO deployed only five hundred men and yet basically 
routed the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola ( UNITA)”, and “…in 
Sierra Leone in 1995, (…) two hundred military contractors from EO pushed ten 
thousand rebels out of the capital and back into more remote regions of the 
country”(Hoffman and Weiss, 2006: 67). This growth of the private military sector is 




the strategic doctrine of feeble states…” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:67). It is worth 
noting that PMCs work for clients. 
 The motivation of each actor will also differ: some act purely for economic purposes, 
others are fueled by ethnic-cultural tensions, and others are driven by religious 
convictions. NSAs tend not to answer to liberal values or acknowledge international 
norms and convections such as human rights agreements. William Reno says that state 
collapse gives “…a comparative advantage to sociopaths” (Hoffman and Weiss, 
2006:66). One can see how the term sociopath is misused in describing the actors in 
contemporary conflicts. One cannot dismiss the behavior of NSAs as maniacal or 
irrational, especially when for many, given the collapse of society, war seems like the 
most rational answer. When the state loses its capacity for vigilance, hidden players rise 
to escape misery, see an opportunity and take advantage of the new globalised playing 
field which gives them the capacity to create their own kingdoms under their own rules. 
1.4-Globalization and the Role of Economics in “New Wars” 
While Clausewitz favored the dictum that politics defined and determined wars, David 
Keen advances an opinion that illustrates how consuming the economic aspect of new 
wars have become, by saying: “… war may be the continuation of economics by other 
means” (Weiss, 2007: 67). Funding wars was always a central concern, which usually 
fell to states as they considered and balanced the costs and benefits of entering into war. 
The privatization of “new wars” is partly fuelled by the ability to make a profit, which is 
enhanced by the ‘shadow economy’ phenomenon
10
. Duffield says: 
                                                          
10“Ideas of non-formal trade and economy, for example, have been qualified by a range of terms including ‘informal’, 
‘parallel’, ‘second’, ‘black’, ‘shadow’, ‘transborder’, and so on. These descriptions have attempted to capture 
economic activity that is non-conventional, extra-legal, unrecorded, unregulated and cross-border in character” 




“globalization has affected a complex process involving the deconstruction and 
decentralization of the power and authority of nation states. Through an 
enhanced ability to forge local-global linkages, market liberalization has 
increased the ease with which new centers of authority have been able to 
emerge.” (Duffield,2001:164).  
 
These new centers of authority are increasingly associated with economic politics and 
patron-client relationships instead of traditional political authority. Duffield reflects on 
the limits of formal economy and identifies that, for example in Angola only 10% of the 
country’s estimated GNP is produced through legally established and publicly regulated 
economic practices, while in Mozambique it accounts for only half of the country’s 
GNP, and in Kenya and Russia only about 40 percent (Duffield, 2001:141). Duffield 
uses the coffee trade across Sudan’s war zone as an illustration of how complex and 
mutable transborder shadow economies are, highlighting that the real danger lurking 
around the corner is that the new non-conventional practices and networks start to rival 
the authority of the states. Another phenomenon adding to conflict is the way weapons 
have become cheap to acquire and pursuing war thus less expensive. As Münkler 
explains  
“two factors play a crucial part in the emergence of the new wars: the ability to 
finance them from the flow of goods and capital generated by globalization and, 
more important still, the fact that they have become cheap to wage.” (Münkler, 
2003 : 17)  
 
No longer is war marked by the steady combat between two well equipped armies on a 
warfront. Now combat is mostly between tribal groups, militia, armed followers of 
warlords, who don’t need high-powered weapons to interminably sustain violence 
directed mainly at unarmed civilians. There is an evident asymmetry between the 




new war actors. However, Münkler warns that no longer will the military and 
technological advantage guarantee victory for the United States. Münkler feels the 
decisive competition will be between high-tech and low-tech weapons, arguing that  
people are aware that “…mere box-cutter knives, if used to hijack airliners so as to 
crash them into buildings and cities, can serve to shake a superpower to its 
foundations”(Münkler, 2003: 10). The media have become a fundamental instrument for 
attracting attention, spreading fear and ensuring psychological impact.  Globalization 
results in a new level of interdependence and interconnection in which the source of 
war-funding can be local, regional and global. 
The Western concept that peace brings greater economic gains is lost to these new 
actors for whom “…force has become a source of income” (Münkler,2003:16). The label 
‘blood diamonds’ illustrates how  natural resources such as gold, timber and cooper can 
also be channeled into funding wars: “UNITA garnered $3.7 billion in revenue from 
diamonds (…) while timber exports to the European Union alone earned Charles Taylor 
$3.6 million within six months of his initial offensive in Liberia” (Weiss, 2007:60). 
Münkler highlights that although poverty can lead to unrest and plunge a country into 
civil war, the conflict will most likely morph into “…protracted transnational wars…” 
(Münkler, 2005:7), if those who are waging the war to gain political power come to the 
conclusion that the natural resources of the country can be sold on the world market. 
According to Münkler: “potential wealth is much more significant than chronic poverty 
as a cause of wars”( Münkler, 2005:7). Likewise Hoffman and Weiss reflect upon the 
significance of economic interests as a catalyst for violence, or if it just an adjacent 





“whereas earlier war was driven primarily by national or imperial conflicts with 
a long-run perspective, in new wars unusual economic opportunities and 
predatory practices with immediate payoffs are pervasive. Whatever their 
explanatory power, the role of rapacious economic interests in driving war and 
hindering humanitarian efforts has grown dramatically in three ways: a market 
for protection services, illicit and destabilizing commerce, and aid 
manipulation.” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:69)   
 
For warlords, war has become a way of life that: “…provides them with a means of 
generating considerable income in the short term and of living out blocked fantasies 
without restrain…” (Münkler 2005:22). The key aspect here is without restraint. 
Münkler warns that warlords “… are mostly found where markets receive no protection 
from the state and non-violent acquisition of goods, services, and legal titles – which is 
always the case when the structure of the state has definitively broken apart” (Münkler, 
2005:17) and they are capable of acting because there is no control. Failed and weak 
states offer the best opportunities for non-state actors, because they lack reliable and 
working institutions, so the civilian population and natural resources fall prey to 
whichever player gains more control. Hoffman and Weiss note that while control of 
territory is essential to maintaining political authority, “new wars” actors seek power 
over the trade in a few resources, such as diamonds and timber, thus focusing instead on 
political economies. Commercial activity has always played a role in war, but its 
significance has been amplified with the intensification of globalization, and it is now 
being used to fuel and give continuity to conflict. Hoffman and Weiss enumerate ways 
in which commercial activity has been distorted. First, profiteers manipulate markets in 
order to gain from the high prices, and “necessities such as grain and gasoline are 
“priced” to account for the expense of production and distribution but have also been 
inflated to enrich speculators and intermediaries.” (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:70). 




way that “…the formal economy of the state is manipulated for private gain – an 
“economy of plunder” (idem). Quoting Paul Collier, from an oft-cited World Bank 
study of conflicts from 1960 to 1995, they point out that countries with “lootable 
resources”
11
 were four times more likely to experience war than those without them. 
Finally, criminals and other actors operating particularly as part of transnational 
networks, will continue to foster the erosion of state power in order to thwart regulation 
and taxation. In sum, “new wars” offer a range of enrichment possibilities through both 
protection and plunder and an aid economy. Lack of central authority will help new 
players who seek to benefit from the loose-fitting control system. However, state failure 
can lead to an absence of the rule of law and security that will eventually pose high 
costs even for the new agents. So to a point, state failure helps the new agents profit 
from the vacuum, but total state failure holds towering costs even for new agents.  
 For Duffield, “new wars” can be identified as network wars and are not the expression 
of breakdown or chaos:  
“in this respect, as far as it is successful, network war is synonymous with the 
emergence of new forms of protection, legitimacy and rights to wealth. Rather 
than aggression, the new wars are organically associated with a process of social 
transformation: the emergence of new forms of authority and zones of 
regulation.” (Duffield, 2001:14) 
 
Looking at “new wars” in a different light than Kaldor, Duffield portrays them neutrally 
as a form of social transformation. 
However, the social costs of wars have not miraculously disappeared. War-torn 
countries find their infrastructures, lands and population devastated. As Münkler 
                                                          
11 According to Hoffman and Weiss, the natural resources that have marked the new wars are diamonds, cobalt, 




remarks, what these new players have managed is to privatize the profit of war while 
nationalizing its cost. Consequently it is no longer viable to wait for the cost of war to 
force resolutions. The dilemma remains: when failed states lack the legitimate authority 
to regain control and limit the collective cost of wars, should outside powers intervene? 
Given the defense strategy the “new wars” players have created in order to ensure the 
war can be long-lasting, outside players can be dragged into the conflict without a way 
to successfully retreat, making the conflict transnational. Consequently, ‘winning’ “new 
wars” relying only on military means becomes very implausible.   
1.5-How “New Wars” Impact Civilians 
“New wars” are marked by the prevalence of civilian casualties, as civilians become 
direct military targets, war becomes increasingly demilitarized and there is no 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. As Hoffman and Weiss 
acknowledge, the increase in civilian casualties is a direct consequence, as civilians are 
targeted, but also an indirect one, from war-related fatalities such as famine.  If, during 
World War II, the concept of Total War already represented an increase in civilian 
casualties, “new wars” are taking the idea of total to the limit. World War I (1914-1918) 
saw 8.3 million soldiers and 8 million civilians killed; World War II, around 23 million 
soldiers and over 57 million civilians (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006:73). Hoffman and 
Weiss emphasize that technology has been a key variable in aiding the rise in civilian 
casualties, because weapons now can inflict greater damage at long distance. Not only 
are civilians military targets, but many operatives turn their own bodies into weapons, 




Children between the ages of eight and fourteen have increasingly joined conflicts as 
child soldiers
12
: the UN estimates their number around 3,000,000 worldwide (Münkler, 
2005:4). Münkler says they have become a preferential instrument for warlords, partly 
because they only need a steady supply of drugs or food in return for blind obedience. 
But as weapons have evolved, their size and weight have decreased, while firing 
frequency has increased, making them “…specially designed for children rather than 
adults” (Münkler, 2005: 18). Having youth as a source of recruitment also considerably 
reduces the cost of waging wars for warlords. For many children the gun is the only way 
they can secure food for others, or of acquiring status and power; either way, having a 
weapon enhances their chance of survival. Child soldiers show an increased indifference 
to both danger and brutality, as guns give them a sense of control. Without military 
discipline, the result is excessive use of violence and scenarios likes the one Peter 
Scholl-Latour describes for war victims in Sierra Leone: “These people without arms or 
legs…are victims of the boy soldiers of the ‘United Revolutionary Front’(RUF)…who, 
high on drugs or alcohol, get their kicks from hacking limbs off civilians completely 
uninvolved in the war” (Münkler, 2005:79). Fighting these child soldiers is another 
dilemma for international peacekeeping forces, especially, Western powers that defend 
children´s rights. The image of innocence associated with children is shattered when 
one encounters child soldiers who are forced to grow with violence and into violence.  
Military violence also becomes associated with starvation and epidemics that become 
visible in refugee camps.  As humanitarian aid workers try to help those in need, both 
                                                          
12 For more information regarding child soldiers consult the website of, the United Nations, “Office Of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General For Children and Armed Conflict”. Having decicated a sub-heading to 
address the new character of contemporary conflict it states: “Children have become more vulnerable due to new 
tactics of warfare, the absence of clear battlefields, the increasing number and diversification of parties to conflict that 
add to the complexity of conflicts and the deliberate targeting of traditional safe havens such as schools and hospitals. 
Moreover, the increasing use of terrorist and counter-terrorist activities sometimes blurs the line between what is 
legitimate and what is not in addressing security threats.” It is also important to consider that the education system is 





they and journalists can become targets themselves; no longer do symbols such as the 
Red Cross or UN logo serve as armor. Münkler warns that at times, as UN’s agencies 
and other non-governmental organizations try to send supplies to aid refugees, they 
inadvertently end up supplying warlords. This happens because “new wars” actors have 
learned to adapt and take advantage of humanitarian interventions to fund their own 
cause, at times even charging for protecting aid workers. The role of humanitarian 
interventions in “new wars” is consequently questioned by many.   
For Hoffman and Weiss it is important to understand that although civilians have 
always been viewed as assets for warfare, they now possess a more prominent political 
rather than military value. Accordingly, the blurring of politics and military that is 
found within the dynamic of “new wars” results in greater civilian casualties.  
Moreover, intentionally displacing populations and driving minorities out has become 
one of the main aims in “new wars”. Kaldor explains that “new wars” tend to borrow 
from the revolutionary warfare strategy and the classic counter-insurgency strategy. One 
great difference identified by Kaldor between the revolutionaries and the “new 
warriors” is the method of political control. For the “new warriors” the key method for 
territorial control tends to be population displacement, which translates into: “…getting 
rid of all possible opponents" (Kaldor, 2012:104). Kaldor emphasizes that the goals 
within “new wars” tend to be about identity politics
13
 rather than ideological aims, so 
“new wars” are a political endeavor: “political mobilization on the basis of identity” 
(Kaldor, 2005:116). Without strong regulatory state institutions, new players take 
advantage of the parallel economy, and the outcome is an increase in corruption and 
                                                          
13  Kaldor uses identity politics’ “…to mean movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for 




criminal activity which uses the rhetoric of identity politics to solidify alliances and gain 
legitimacy. Kaldor concludes that:  
“former administrative or intellectual elites ally with a motley collection of 
adventurers on the margins of society to mobilize the excluded and abandoned, 
the alienated and insecure, for the purposes of capturing and sustaining power.” 
(Kaldor, 2012:87)  
 
Control of the environment for “new warriors”: “…depends on continuing fear and 
insecurity and on the perpetuation of hatred of the other.” (Kaldor, 2012:104) 
Techniques for population displacement include: the “systematic murder of those with 
different labels…” as was the case in Rwanda; “ethnic cleansing, that is to say, forcible 
population expulsion…”, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Darfur; or “rendering an area 
uninhabitable” using physical, economic and psychological methods (Kaldor, 
2012:104). Kaldor reports a high increase in the numbers of refugees and displaced 
persons, (consult Graph 1.D in appendix) citing that “according to UNHCR, the global 
refugee population rose from 2.4 million people in 1975 to 10.5 million people in 1985 
and 14.4 million people in 1995… and rose again to 15.4 million in 2010” (Kaldor, 
2005:106) 
Since “new wars” are characterized by their origins in internal conflicts, it is only 
natural that those who suffer the most from the conflict are civilians. Given that the 
country becomes a battlefield, there is nowhere to run, and civilians are consumed by 
the violence and the atmosphere of insecurity and fear. Furthermore, because “new 
wars” focus on controlling the allegiance or the submission of the population, it 
becomes vital for military tactics and grand strategies to take the socio-cultural 




The humanitarian dimension acquires a growing predominance in dealing with and 
understanding “new wars”.  
1.6- The Growing Relevance of International Humanitarian Law 
Although it is not within the scope of our work to analyze International Humanitarian 
Law, it is difficult to fully grasp the concept of “new wars” without considering the 
growing impact of the emergence of International Humanitarian Law. While the act of 
war was initially free from any limitations, the history of warfare has been accompanied 
by a growing preoccupation with drawing boundaries to the horrors of war. It is 
important to note that nowadays states have legally almost lost the right to war
14
 and 
Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter limit them to a right to war for 
collective or individual self-defense. Outside the exception of self-defense, waging war 
must be monitored and mediated by the Security Council.  
Humanitarian interventions have evolved in response to the change in the nature of 
war.
15
 During the Cold War states undertook more unilateral interventions to secure 
their own interests. Even today self interest remains a backstage motive for 
humanitarian interventions. There was a global reluctance during the Cold War to 
advocate intervention for humanitarian purposes, with Rwanda as an example. Hedley 
Bull justifies this by saying,  
“The reluctance evident in the International Community even to experiment with 
the conception of a right of humanitarian intervention reflects not only an 
unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by 
                                                          
14  In the view of Antonie Bouvier, “jus contra bellum”:“Hoje, porém, o uso da força entre Estados é proibido por 
uma regra peremptória do Direito Internacional4 (o jus ad bellum se converteu em jus contra bellum). As exceções a 
essa  proibição são permitidas em casos de auto-defesa individual ou coletiva,5 nas medidas  
impositivas do Conselho de Segurança6  e supostamente para garantir o direito à autodeterminação dos povos7 
(guerras de libertação nacional).” (Bouvier, 2011: 15) 
15 The United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping provides a table of fatalities suffered by peacekeeping forces in 
1948-2014.  It indicates a significant rise over time, albeit this is also an indicator that peacekeeping interventions 




conceding such a right to individual states, but also a lack of any agreed doctrine 
as to what human rights are.” (Smith and Baylis,2005:563) 
 
In the post-cold war era, as the challenges and the nature of war changed, the human 
rights culture developed. International Humanitarian Law is a field that has emerged 
with the goal of “…introducing a minimal level of regulation of the conduct of 
hostilities, in such a way as to attenuate (not eliminate) some of their most brutal 
effects”
16
  According to Francisco Leandro, in As Armas das Vítimas: Um novo prisma 
sobre o Direito Internacional Humánitario dos Conflitos Armados, International 
Humanitarian and Armed Conflict Law is a branch of International Public Law, and in 
times of conflict (not just war) regulates relations between states and between other 
international-law subjects
17
. This demonstrates a latent concern to humanize war.  By 
evoking the principle of humanity, it becomes perceptible that the maintenance of peace 
and the consequences of war transcend the borders of single states, and invoke 
responsibility on the part of humanity as a whole.  However, in practical terms the 
situation is more complex. As Jorge Gouveia points out, parallel to the development of 
international humanitarian law there has been a debate on when it is legitimate for other 
states or international actors to breach countries’ sovereignty for humanitarian 
intervention purposes, and whether there is only a right of staging humanitarian 
interventions, or ultimately a duty to undertake humanitarian interventions.  
                                                          
16  “(…) é introduzir um nível mínimo de regulação da condução das hostilidades, de modo a atenuar alguns dos seus 
efeitos mais brutais (não eliminá-los)” ( Francisco Da Silva Leandro,2005:34) 
17 Using as a foundation the principle of humanity, its main focus is the protection of individuals who are not directly 
participating in the fighting, such as civilians and humanitarian aid forces, and curiously enough it has evolved to 
protect the cultural heritage and the environment. The development of International Humanitarian Law can be 
divided into three phases: 1899 and 1907, with the Hague Conventions (law of the Hague); 1949, with the Geneva 




 Military intervention is a state’s weapon of choice when dealing with cases labeled as 
threats to global peace and security
18
. Being first-hand defenders and advocates of 
human rights, consolidated liberal democracies sometimes find themselves in less than 
ideal positions
19
: they struggle to continuously uphold the ethics of human dignity.  
Francisco Leandro interprets that weapons can have a multitude of uses, and states are 
legitimate in using them to protect their population. However, since weapons can serve 
different aims in different circumstances, he emphasizes that the potential for using 
violence in civilized societies must always be regulated by the law. This is an aspect 
that weak or failed states cannot successfully regulate. For Francisco Leandro the use of 
military force for peace operations is linked to four principles: necessity, discrimination, 
proportionality, and not claiming humanitarian reasons as a cover for other illicit 
activities - “chivalry” (Leandro, 2005:51). The use of force will always incentivize 
stronger retaliation, so it is important to consider whether the intervention will cause 
greater damage than good
20
.  
The dilemma between security and individual rights is not only an internal struggle, but 
when faced with the possibility of humanitarian interventions, becomes a global one. 
Advocating human rights becomes an ethical commitment, but at times there is 
                                                          
18 Attempting to secure greater worldwide concessions regarding when a military intervention should be staged and 
how, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty produced a 2001 report, The Responsibility 
to Protect, which emphasizes the responsibility of protecting individuals over state sovereignty. 
19 Documents such as An Agenda For Peace highlight the call of organizations like the UN for the development of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding methods. “The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them 
will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable 
economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of 
massively destructive weapons.”  It is important to note that the report also clearly advances states as indispensable to 
upholding peace: “The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental 
sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to 
understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever 
more interdependent world.” Again we encounter the clash between sovereignty and interests linked to human rights 
and moral dimensions. ( An Agenda For Peace, 1992) 
20 Michael Ignatieff advances the argument of ‘the lesser evil’ arguing that liberal democracies are not except from 
the use of force, but they are obliged to limit the use of force. The lesser evil position acknowledges that liberal 
democracies are based on a constant balance between the security of the majority and the rights of the individual, so 
“rights may have to bow to security in some instances, but there had better be good reasons, and there had better be 




reluctance to exercise that power both internally and externally. Even when choosing a 
lesser evil, one is making a moral judgment – in the end, “bad consequences are not 
always predictable, and so in choosing the lesser evil course, we may have to take a shot 
in the dark, knowing, unfortunately that good intentions cannot exempt us from blame 
when bad consequences result” (Ignatieff, 2005:5).  
Humanitarian interventions are a practical test for human rights defenders and the 
choice to intervene is a precarious one. Relations between states, international 
government organizations and non-governmental organizations are easier to control 
through international laws and conventions, but when dealing with individuals, such as 
warlords and terrorists, who don’t abide by the same rules, negotiating limitations 
becomes an intrinsic task. Münkler notes that international legal norms are mainly 
directed at states, so however weak a state is, it is still illegible for punishment if it 
breaks the rules. On the other hand, networks like Al Qaeda can’t be sanctioned in the 
same way. However, it is also vital to understand that ratified treaties have little 
importance without a true commitment from the states, organizations and individuals to 
the defense of human rights and the upholding of the dignity of the human person.  
Having states answer to international norms confirms that states no longer have 
‘absolute sovereignty’. However, states remain central when it comes to upholding and 
developing International Humanitarian Law. As Walzer emphasizes, “collective security 
depends on collective recognition” (Walzer, 2006: xvi).  
As the individual grows in importance in the international arena, the positions of the 
state is discussed. This also has an impact in the conduct and monitoring of the new 
conflicts.  Francisco Leandro argues that military power is central for solving current 




relevance and position of states. Loss of its ability to employ military means weakens 
the state’s strength and position in the international stage.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross has considered some of the 
contemporary challenges, which echo some of the characteristics discussed in this 
chapter.  Firstly, the fight against terrorism poses a unique challenge for the Red Cross 
and the application of International Humanitarian Law. Terrorism is seen as a war crime 
and the term ‘fight against terrorism’ is meant to illustrate how some ways of combating 
terrorisms do not amount to a physical declaration of war. Secondly, the increasing 
direct participation of civilians in hostilities. Some fighters might act as clandestine 
civilians by day, but be involved in acts of belligerence at night; so: “the contemporary 
challenge, therefore, is to provide clear criteria for the distinction not just between 
civilians and the armed forces, but also between peaceful civilians and civilians who 
directly participate in hostilities.”
21
 Thirdly, the development of technology and the 
emergence of new weapons, such as drones and cyber attacks, raise questions regarding 
the need to clarify protocols or design new ones. Fourthly, in the growing environment 
of conflict the main concern is not the lack of rules, but the lack of respect for them. To 
reinforce the importance of respecting rules and protocols of International Humanitarian 
Law, the Red Cross looks to the states and other parties of armed conflicts: it is 
important to take into consideration that they name the states in first place. Fifthly, there 
is a growing concern with the privatization of war and the involvement of private 
security companies, and how International Humanitarian Law is applied and respected.  
                                                          






Because International Humanitarian Law is a fairly recent dimension of international 
life, it is something novel and exciting and as such its application in the dynamic of 
contemporary conflicts is also evolving.  
Considering all these aspects -how the delimitation and duration of “new wars” is 
augmented; the multitude of agents involved in the conflict; the economics and the 
effect of globalization; the way civilians have become direct military targets; and how 
Humanitarian International Law has grown in relevance- we come to the conclusion that 
Kaldor’s contribution to the interpretation of the international order is valuable as the 
concept of “new wars” helps us to perceive crucial transformations in warfare today, 
and accordingly, in finding fresh solutions in conflict management. The effect of these 














Chapter II: State and Governance: Political legitimacy, Monopoly of 
Force and Guarantee of Security 
 
 “Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry” 
Winston Churchill 
 
2.1- Defining the Concept of State 
War has a long history of being identified as a conflict between states, whose birth it 
accompanied. The discipline, organization and mobilization of force and resources 
required for states to effectively execute war tactics established and strengthened state 
sovereignty. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, states have gained a central 
position in the international order. From then on the sovereignty and importance of 
states were celebrated and emphasized by authors such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, and 
more recently by others like Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau. For Hobbes, without 
states human beings would find themselves in a constant state of war. Although the 
importance of organization and individuals has grown, states continue to occupy a vital 
position in the international order, being considered primary actors by different schools 
in International Relations theory, for which the regulation and monitoring of war 
between states remains a central concern. Moreover, war between states remains a 
crucial motivation and focus of academic works. However, the state has not survived all 
these years without adapting to different circumstances; the absolute sovereign state 
described by Machiavelli and Hobbes has undergone alterations to fit new epochs.  
Political theories are subject to change due to changes in environment, culture and 
people’s behavior. One could question the old state-centered paradigm of international 
relations and consider the possibility of new emerging paradigms that illustrate a new 




Proença Garcia defines the international system that emerged at the start of the 
21
st
century as a complex new arena that no longer presents the characteristics of being 
subject to a stable balance of power between absolute sovereign states, or the umbrella 
of a bi-polar or uni-polar order, in his work Da Guerra e da Estratégia. This author 
characterizes this embryonic international system as follows: 
“In the present international system characterized by its complexity, 
nonlinearity, unpredictability, heterogeneity, changeability and dynamism, the 
threat that maintained well defined spatial and temporal coordinates disappeared, 
giving rise to a period of abnormal instability, with a broad series of risks and 
dangers, some new, some old, which only rose in the hierarchy of state 
concerns.”
22
 (Proença Garcia,2011:96) 
 
In the mist of this uniqueness, war paradigms were bound to shift. The relationship 
between the state and war has been a complex one marked by continuous development. 
The evolution of the liberal democratic state, and the growing emergence of democracy 
as a guiding principal in the international system, have led to the formulation of a 
democratic peace theory, which advocates that liberal democracies are less prone to go 
to war with each other.  However, this has not translated into peace in other regions, 
such as the Middle East or Africa, but instead resulted in a discharge of what could be 
called low-intensity conflicts
23
. For Charles W. Kegley, Jr, “the disappearance of large-
scale war, accompanied by the ascension of small-scale warfare, produced two systems: 
a stable ‘central system’, and an unstable ‘peripheral system’.”
24
 “New wars” 
characteristics are less common in consolidated states, but are conditioned to a specific 
                                                          
22 “No actual sistema internacional caracterizado pela sua complexidade, não linearidade, imprevisibilidade, 
heterogeneidade, mutabilidade e dinamismo, a ameaça, que mantinha coordenadas de espaço e de tempo bem 
definidas desapareceu, dando lugar a um período de anormal instabilidade, com uma ampla série de riscos e perigos, 
uns novos, outros antigos, que apenas subiram na hierarquia das preocupações dos Estados.”(Garcia, 2011:96) 
23 Martin Van Creveld (1999) in his work, The Transformation of War, enumerates the characteristics of low-
intensity conflict: they occur in “less developed” regions, they rarely include regular armies on both sides, they do not 
rely on modern high-technology weapons and numerically the level of civilian causalities tends to be higher. For 
Creveld low-intensity conflicts since 1945 have become politically the most significant form of war.  
24 “O desaparecimento da guerra em larga escala, acompanhado da ascensão da guerra em pequena escala, produziu 




environment that can be found in areas marked by a lack of state and governance. To 
use terms such as ‘central system’ or ‘peripheral system’ reflects a solidified order, 
while what seems to be emerging is a complex system with no specific center.  
 Kalevi J. Holsti’s in, The State, War, and the State of War, approach offers a more 
interesting reading of the challenges states in the new regions of conflict are facing. For 
Holsti, the key war problem in the Third World is not primarily dictated by relations 
between states, but is dependent on security within states: “the problem of 
contemporary and future international politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of 
domestic politics.” (Holsti, 1996:15) Today what are considered “strong” states of 
Europe underwent centuries of consolidation and evolution marked by warfare. 
However, because it was a different epoch, the warfare was primarily between states, 
although violence within states was also present, as they established their sovereignty. 
In a contemporary international scenario where war between states has become heavily 
regulated, internal state problems take on a new dimension. Moreover Holsti 
emphasizes that although in some countries state and community converge, in several 
regions of the world state and community diverge, and so within a state there is a clash 
between communities:  
“the prize is not territory, resources, a crown, or kind of state. The wars are not 
about foreign policy, security, honor, or status; they are about statehood, 
governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states” 
(Holsti, 1996:21) 
 
Because these are conflicts between communities and not states, the style of warfare 
also differs from the classical ‘old war’ spectrum. “New wars” become intrinsically 




Here it is useful to keep in mind the attempt to define statehood in a political context 
which Max Weber advances in Politics as a Vocation. To define a ‘state’ one must not 
look at the ends, but rather focus on the “…specific means peculiar to it…” (Weber, 
1918: 1), in particular the legitimate use of physical force of which the state holds the 
monopoly, making it, according to Weber, the sole possessor of the ‘right’ to use of 
force and Weber clearly states that: 
“…we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 
Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the 
present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to 
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it.” (Weber, 1918:1) 
 
We should note how Weber also establishes a connection between the state and a 
community, a relationship that according to Holsti is not cemented in many societies. 
As we have seen above, in “new wars” what tends to happen is that the monopoly of 
force is not controlled by the state; rather there is a vacuum which is filled by a 
multitude of new agents such as militia, warlords or criminal groups. If states cannot 
exercise their control over the legitimate monopoly of force, then by Weber’s definition 
they can no longer fully be called a state. Currently, we have seen an emergence of new 
terms such as ‘weak states’ or ‘failing states’ to define situations in which it is perceived 








2.2-The Problem of State Erosion 
For authors such as Kaldor and Howard
25
, one key issue that haunts the present day is 
that the power/strength of the state seems to be faltering. That there is a patent 
distinction between the state under the Westphalia order and present times is clear
26
, but 
the danger both Kaldor and Howard fear is that the state is being subject to a process of 
erosion.  
For Howard the danger of losing states as organs central to the international system is 
that while states make war possible, they also make peace possible, and moreover they 
“…still remain the only effective mechanism through which people can govern 
themselves…” (Howard, 2001:103). So the weakening of the state would only weaken 
the world order. Accordingly, the sovereign state is vulnerable to three kinds of 
corrosion: from above through the pressure of supranational entities; laterally through 
multinational corporations; and from below by the lack of support from individuals who 
lack loyalty to governments and individual commitment. Howard also warns that: 
“…the weaker the state the more its sovereignty is likely to be challenged” (Howard, 
2001: 96). It can be interpreted that this would imply a possible vicious circle: as states 
grow weaker, they suffer more debilitations, which makes it harder for them to regain 
their strength.  This seems to be consisted with the Kaldor’s perspective that “new 
wars” have a high state-disintegration capability, because unlike old European wars they 
                                                          
25 Within the scope of this academic work, it is only possible to mention the importance of a selected group of authors 
in this study field.  
26  Joseph Nye in Compreender os Conflitos Internacionais, (2002) offers an interpretation of how the world order is 
marked by an increasing interdependence at multiple levels where the balance of power is no longer maintained 
solely by military power. With the merging of soft power, the concept of power is becoming more complex and 
multidimensional as states become more permeable. For Nye the evolution of translational communications, 




tend to make the state weaker rather than stronger.
 27
 If this does indeed happen, it will 
make it harder for states to regain their power and would further blur the lines between 
peace and war and undermine the ability of states to solve and overcome the constant 
environment of conflict. Kaldor argues that the state is not yet in demise, but has 
undergone transformations in the sense that: “the state is changing in different ways and 
that, perhaps, the most important aspect of that transformation is the changing role of 
the state in relation to organized violence”. (Kaldor, 2012: 203) For Kaldor, the 
monopoly of violence has been eroded from above by the increasing international rules 
and institutions and from below by the privatization of violence. This is why Kaldor 
believes that “new wars” sprout in a context where there has been an erosion of the 
autonomy of the state, or in severe cases, when the state has disintegrated and the 
monopoly of legitimate organized violence has been corroded.
28
   
We tend to agree with both authors who do not downplay the role of the state, but rather 
emphasize the importance of state-building. However, both identify that there are some 
variables that are altering the view and role of the state. It becomes crucial to understand 
the new pressures and challenges the state faces in order to surpass them. The state has 
once again to adapt to the new historical context.
29
 Although “new wars” have a global 
impact and dimension, we must keep in mind that they are primarily fought at a local 
level, and when analyzing these conflicts it becomes necessary to consider the ‘quality’ 
of the state.   As Hoffman and Weiss put it: “…new wars emerge against a backdrop of 
distorted order, and state institutions often exhibit signs of distortion, corrosion or 
                                                          
27 For Van Creveld, the low intensity conflict also undermines the structure of the state. If a state cannot efficiently 
deal with low intensity conflict, then it will end up undermining itself internally: “either modern states cope with low-
intensity conflict, or else they will disappear…” ( Van Creveld, 1996: 224) 
28For Weber, the state relies on a relationship in which men dominate men, supported by means of legitimate 
violence, so for the state to exist, the dominated have to obey authority (those who govern).  
29 Adriano Moreira, in A Circunstância do Estado Exíguo, also reflects on the state sovereignty, identifying that there 
has always been a clash between the Machiavellian legacy and the humanist legacy. Although the state is far from 
being dismissed, the complex evolution of the relationship between population, territory, frontiers and sovereignty 




incapacity”. (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006: 61) It is in this sense we can establish a 
connection between “new wars” and the state; revisiting the importance of legitimacy, 
the monopoly of force and good governance.  
2.3- Dilemma of Weak and Failed States 
A series of names and definitions have emerged to describe states that display a 
fractured order. The two terms under focus in this dissertation are ‘weak states’ and 
‘failed states’. As Hoffman and Weiss explain, weak state is employed: “…to 
emphasize how the power of states is shrunk or effectively shaped by other actors” 
(Hoffman and Weiss, 2006: 61). Besides, weak states can be characterized by two 
elements: firstly, weak states tend to lack the capacity to “…pursue national interests 
formulated by an effective leader or bureaucracy” (2006: 62). This inability to pursue 
goals may also be worsened by a lack of necessary financial resources, technology or 
skilled population. The second element is that they don’t have an authority to take 
credible and obligatory decisions. Both these elements have the detrimental 
consequence of corroding support from citizens. This is a central concern and poses a 
critical problem, as Hoffman and Weiss describe: 
“without the support of citizens, such states are therefore not perceived as being 
legitimate. This lack of authority may in turn further undermine capacity. 
Disdainful populations can be controlled through violence, fear, and other 
repressive measures. Yet the ability of the state to govern and manage the 
resources within its borders can be still further eroded in the process of trying to 
instill fear and repress dissidents, armed or not.” (idem) 
 
In this scenario the state may find itself in a hostile relationship with its own population, 
a situation that is very delicate, inflexible to manage and hard to overcome. If the state 
loses its capacity to guarantee security and basic needs, both material and non-material, 




corruption, or become stuck in a predatory condition by being manipulated by non-state 
actors. Most of these operate in the criminal realm, such as in drugs and arms 
trafficking. On the other hand, when referring to failed states the word “…‘failed’ 




Measuring the ‘strength’ of a state can be a contested concept. For Francis Fukuyama it 
becomes essential to distinguish between the scope of state activities and the strength of 
the state. The scope “...refers to the different functions and goals taken on by 
governments”, while the strength refers to the “…ability of states to plan and execute 
policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently…” (Fukuyama, 2004:7), 
including: 
“..the ability to formulate and carry out policies and enact laws; to administrate 
efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy; to control graft, corruption, and 
bribery; to maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in 
government institutions; and, most important, to enforce laws.” (Fukuyama, 
2004:9) 
 
It is interesting to compare this point of view with The World Bank who developed six 
dimensions of governance
31
: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. Similarly the European Commission has developed a check-list of root 
causes of conflict to try to identify conflict circumstances and be able to act promptly
32
. 
                                                          
30 The concept of “failed states” and “weak states” remain controversial in International Relations debates. We use 
this expression according to Hoffman and Weiss.  
31 The World Bank interprets governance as: “…broadly defined as the set of traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”   
32 European Commission Check-list for root causes of conflict: 1)Legitimacy of the state; 2)Rule of law; 3)Respect 
for fundamental rights; 4)Civil society and media; 5)Relations between communities and dispute-solving 




In it one identifies indicators for attempting to measure legitimacy, the type of relations 
within the community and whether there are large social disparities. Indicators like 
these help assess whether a state can be seen as weak; however, one must always be 
aware of their limitations.  For Holsti, state strength is: 
“…the capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract 
the resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential 
element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within 
defined territorial limits, and to operate within a context of a consensus-based 
political community.” (Holsti, 1996: 83) 
 
In the above statement it is worth highlighting the word loyalty, which will be linked to 
the concept of legitimacy discussed later, as well as the phrase consensus-based 
political community, which for Holsti is a fundamental motive behind future conflicts. 
Moreover it is worth noting that once again the exercise of a monopoly over legitimate 
use of force is seen as an essential element of sovereignty, and as such influences a 
state’s strength.  
Holsti claims that “the problem of contemporary and future international politics, it 
turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic politics. The source of the problem is 
found in the nature of new states” (Holsti, 1996: 15). If Holsti’s interpretation is correct, 
then understanding the state and studying ways to assess the efficiency of governance is 
far from being a waste of time, as the state remains a focal point. Moreover, we can 
consider that the surfacing and development of “new wars” is directly associated with 
the character and strength of the state. Similarly “new wars” may not employ 
completely new tactics or personalities, but they differ in form precisely because they 
are inserted into a new context, marked by a strong globalization effect but also by a 
                                                                                                                                                                          





unyielding local manifestation which relates to the state in terms of both its nature and 
its strength. 
 In Western civilization the state has evolved over the years into a more or less stable 
format, and although each state is marked by its culture and history, there is a common 
underlying trend. Many developing countries seem to be undergoing a process of trying 
to establish their state, but face several challenges. During the post-conflict phase, state-
building and the transition to democracy is also a very difficult process.
33
 Consequently, 
these days one central aspect of international politics is state-maintenance and dealing 
with state failures.  We will return to the subject of weak and failed states at the end of 
the chapter.  
2.4-Relationship between Bad Governance and Violence: Legitimacy Crisis 
Legitimacy is at the basis of government action and is indispensible to ensure a stable 
society. As Weber notes, in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, an order 
that is upheld by “…motives of pure expediency…” (Weber, 1964:125) is less stable 
than an order founded on habit; however, both orders are considerably more unstable 
than “… an order which enjoys the prestige of being considered binding, or, as it may 
be expressed of ‘legitimacy’ ” (Weber, 1964:125). It becomes clear that legitimacy is a 
fundamental variable for ensuring stability within a state. Without a government that 
enjoys a significant degree of legitimacy, the relationship between government and 
citizens is weakened. Granted, what one population sees as legitimate may not accord 
                                                          
33 The theme of democracy and democratic transitions is extensively addressed by Marc F. Plattner and Larry 
Diamond in the compilation of texts of The Global Resurgence of Democracy (1996), and also in Larry Diamond’s 
book, The spirit of Democracy (2008) and Marc F. Plattner’s work, Democracy Without Borders? (2007). This theme 




with what another perceives as legitimate.
34
 Weber explains that legitimacy may be 
upheld into two fundamental ways
35
: 
“(I) from purely disinterested motives, which may in turn be (a) purely effectual, 
consisting in an emotionally determined loyalty; or (b) may derive from a 
rational belief in the absolute validity of the order as an expression of ultimate 
values whether they be moral esthetic or of any other type; or (c) may originate 
in religious attitudes, through the belief in the dependence of some condition of 
religious salvation on conformity with the order; (2) also or entirely by self-
interest, that is, through expectations of specific ulterior consequences, but 
consequences which are, to be sure, of a particular kind. “ (Weber, 1964: 127) 
 
As Weber explains, the adherence to an order can have numerous motivations, and can 
often result from an overlap of the four bases. We can understand how legitimacy is a 
complex subject influenced by various variables. Consequently, it is marked by a 
particular dimension of vulnerability, making the upholding of legitimacy a continuous 
endeavor.  
In a similar approach, Holsti, argues that legitimacy can be divided into vertical 
legitimacy and horizontal legitimacy: “the first deals with authority, consent, and 
loyalty to ideas(s) of the state and its institutions; the second deals with the definition 
and political role of community” (Holsti, 1996: 84).  It is worth highlighting, as Holsti 
does, that legitimacy is a variable and not a constant; its presence and strength can vary 
depending on many factors.  
                                                          
34 Although it is not my aim to discuss specific political systems, it is relevant and worth mentioning that having a 
sovereign state is a strong prerequisite to maintaining, consolidating, or building a viable liberal democratic state- this 
argument is developed by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan in their book, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation.   
35 In addition Weber enumerates four bases for legitimacy: 
“ (a) by tradition; a belief in the legitimacy of what has always existed; (b) by virtue of effectual attitudes specially 
emotional, legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed or a model to imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief 
in its absolute value, thus lending it the validity of an absolute and final commitment; (d) because it has been 
established in a manner which is recognized to be legal. This legality may be treated as legitimate in either of two 
ways: on the one hand, it may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on the relevant terms. On 
the other hand, it may be imposed on the basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority over the relevant persons 





In our view, these definitions are completed by Kaldor’s understanding of legitimacy as: 
“…both consent and even support for political institutions, as well as the notion that 
these institutions acquire their authority on the basis of operating within an agreed set of 
rules- the rule of law” (Kaldor, 2012: 122). This understanding is particularly useful to 
our work because, Kaldor, identifies that the relationship between the process of 
governance, legitimacy and forms of security is complex, highlighting that guaranteeing 
the physical protection of citizens and territory, maintaining the rule of law, and 
cultivating a secure environment, are vital for a government to uphold legitimacy. 
However, without some form of already established legitimacy, government cannot 
perform these tasks efficiently. This creates a difficult conundrum that each government 
has to balance in order to enjoy a fairly stable environment and avoid a subverting 
internal conflict. Ensuring security (established order, physical protection, and 
administrative security) requires the state to hold an organized monopoly of force: by 
providing security, legitimacy can be reinforced. However, this takes state resources to 
control the population, as well as the ability to foster trust. In particular, trust, is a major 
qualifier in state building and its absence might facilitate the emergence of alternative 
actors “entrusted” to take over the state’s role. This gives room for “new wars”.   
As Holsti points out: “in most modern states… legitimacy is performance-based. The 
state has to earn and maintain its right to rule through the provision of services, 
including security, law and order, justice, and a varying range of welfare measures.” 
(Holsti, 1996: 91). However, “new wars” conflict is inserted into a context where the 
modern state lacks the necessary autonomy and legitimacy to exercise the monopoly of 
organized force. Thus, conflicts tend to take on the characteristic of “new wars” in 




monopoly of force starts to crack and new players appear to fill the vacuum, the state 
continues to lose its autonomy and its ability to protect, leading to a legitimacy crisis.  
An example of this might be a trend highlighted by Münkler: for this author the growing 
environmental degradations have direct implications for resource distribution, generate 
an imbalance in demographic rates and foster instability in international market 
inequality. Furthermore, environmental degradations also influence educational and 
living opportunities. Consequently, in some regions of the globe, given the fragility of 
the state, “…in the twenty-first century large sections of the population may well see 
their sole chance for the future in waging wars and emerging successful” ( Münkler, 
2003:11). One might argue that absence of hope for peaceful development and reliance 
on violent change may find justification in the lack of trust in government – to put it 
plainly: because in weak states and failed states there is no reliable authority and people 
feel the need to take matters into their own hands.  
Furthermore, the groups who have the capacity to impose violence tend to add to the 
grievances rather than offer a viable way out. This can help explain why “new wars” 
players are ready to give up their lives for their cause, as Münkler warns: “…the use of 
force for a better future will become a key element of their political reasoning and they 
will be ready not only to fight for vital resources but also to begin asymmetrical wars 
with superior adversaries” (Münkler, 2003:11). Without a reliable state that is able to 
provide security and offer the population non-violent ways to acquire a profitable 
future, people will seek other sources, as we have seen before regarding the increase in 




Therefore we come to the conclusion that legitimacy plays a primary role when it comes 
to dealing with “new wars” and agree with Kaldor and Hannah Arendt
36
 that “the key to 
the control of violence is the reconstruction of legitimacy”(Kaldor, 2012:122). The 
legitimate monopoly of force exercised by the state allows for a better organization and 
monitoring of violence. When the state’s legitimate monopoly of force is broken down, 
as it is the case with “new wars”, violence becomes harder to control. According to 
Kaldor, in “new wars” “ the strategy is political control on the basis of exclusion – in 
particular, population displacement – and the tactics for achieving these goals  are terror 
and destabilization” (Kaldor, 2012:122). This leads her to conclude that: “violence may 
be controlled sporadically through uneasy truces and ceasefires, but in situations in 
which the moral administrative and practical constraints against private violence have 
broken down, they rarely last long” (Kaldor, 2012: 123).  
In a time where conflict management and conflict resolution are central aspects of 
international security, relying on legitimate governments to control violence would 
facilitate the task. However because most states that are experiencing high levels of 
conflict lack the ability to uphold a legitimate monopoly of force, limiting violence 
becomes a difficult undertaking when one has to deal with a multitude of actors and 
interests.  
Reconstructing legitimacy becomes a central aspect of the re-establishment of the 
monopoly of force, which can only effectively be restored through not just a political 
process, but a legal and civil one too. An interesting notion is that within warzones one 
                                                          
36 Hannah Arendt, in On Violence, clearly distinguishes between power and violence.  Kaldor quotes Arendt to 
illustrate that no government founded solely on the use of violence has ever been possible. Arendt clearly states that 
“even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs a power basis… single men without others 
to support them never have enough power to use violence successfully” ( Arendt,1970: 50). Taking it one step 
further, Arendt also states that power and violence are opposites and when one of these rules is absolute the other is 
absent, thus: “violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s 




can still find what Kaldor depicts as ‘islands of civility’. She gives the examples of the 
town of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the self-defense units created in Southern 
Rwanda, among others. Moreover, although for many violence is the only way out, 
there are those who seek alternative routes. However, in a nutshell, this is the basic 
challenge of state-building.  For Kaldor, “new wars” are about state disintegration, and 
at the end of “new wars” the state is further incapacitated; “new wars are wars of un-
building rather than state-building” ( Johnson,2007:16).  
2.5-Asserting the Might of the State 
While the multitude of actors may weaken the legitimacy of the state and break down its 
monopoly of force, this does not necessarily mean that all non-state actors are 
attempting to replace the state. Duffield acknowledges that: “warlord and strongman 
entities, while they may exist outside of the state, and can be in open conflict with it, are 
usually not attempting to live apart from it or, indeed, to replace the state altogether” 
(Duffield, 2001: 176). Given that the state is still the key player in the international 
system. 
So, although the legitimacy of governments can be questioned by international 
organization, the importance of the concept of the state as the sovereign entity is not
37
. 
Moreover, it is also important to consider that although governments and non-state 
actors can find themselves in competition or even at war, they are also quick to enter 
into mutually beneficial agreements. These can take the shape of commercial-military 
trade networks and create parallel systems, as Duffield demonstrates: 
                                                          
37 Nye in, Compreender os Conflitos Internacionais, dedicates a chapter to interdependence, globalization and the era 
of information. The growing interdependence Nye identifies in the international system, causes national and foreign 
issues to be blended together and create more complex patterns of conflict. This interdependence brings both benefits 
and costs. One cost seems to be that of subjecting the state to a new vulnerability. No longer are states the sole 
international actors and force is no longer the dominant instrument. Nye concludes that although states as a 





“In terms of what the parallel system requires of the state, the single most 
prevalent demand is for legal paperwork that falsifies the origins and status of 
goods, people, modes of transports, ports of entry, and so on. From Angolan 
diamonds to ivory from the Central African Republic and Nigerian petrol, border 
officials, customs officers and government functionaries across the continent are 
engaged in a huge process of reclassification and falsification without which the 
shadow economy would not be possible” (Duffield, 2001: 177) 
 
At this point we can question to what extent do governments, in certain cases, become 
just another actor worried about their personal interests rather, than looking out for the 
welfare of the state?  For Duffield: “…the nation state is no longer in its ascendancy. 
Among other things, its power has been reconfigured and transformed through the 
growing influence of the non-state and non-territorial relations of global liberal 
governance” (Duffield, 2001:257). This has a particular effect on organized violence, 
which according to Duffield now operates: “… at a lower destructive level, it appears to 
assume more systemic, intrusive and non-controllable forms” (idem). When the 
monopoly of legitimate force is controlled by the state, it seems violence can be subject 
to greater control. As violence disperses throughout the various sectors of society it 
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and a new challenge, because:  
“from security-conscious airline operators to armed African cattle herders, in 
different ways the threat or actuality of pervasive violence now affects all of us 
most of the time. The challenge for global liberal governance is to equal or better 
the relative security that existed for much of the Cold War when nation states 
had a greater regulatory influence.” (Duffield, 2001: 257)  
Given Kaldor’s and Duffield’s arguments, we can interpret that the way violence is 
organized is a key alteration that has a crucial role in “new wars” and is of fundamental 
relevance to the prevalence of the states.  Having the state uphold a legitimate 
monopoly of force allows warfare to be subject to regulations which can enhance the 
ability, to attempt, to control violence. Once the monopoly of force is broken, the 




surface to fill the vacuum and are concerned with channeling violence to achieve their 
own interests. One central aspect becomes how the state can regain control within an 
atmosphere of multiple and simultaneous outbreaks of violent conflict.   
2.6-“New wars” as Promoters of State-Disintegration? 
Fukuyama highlights that from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attack on the United States territory, the great majority of international 
crises revolved around weak or failed states
38
. Citing examples such as Somalia, Haiti, 
Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and East Timor, 
Fukuyama concludes that: “since the end of the Cold War, weak or failing states have 
arguably become the single most important problem for international order” 
(Fukuyama, 2004: 92). Consequently, these also pose new security dilemmas beyond 
the humanitarian dimension, as Fukuyama explains: 
“the possibility of combining radical Islamism with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) suddenly meant that events going on in a distant, chaotic parts of the 
globe could matter intensely to the United States and other rich and powerful 
countries. Traditional forms of deterrence or containment would not work 
against this type of non-state actor, so security concerns demanded reaching 
inside of states and changing their regime to prevent future threats from arising” 
(Fukuyama, 2004: 93) 
 
This statement reinforces the global dimension “new wars” now exert, not only for 
human rights reasons and by calling on the responsibility of liberal democracies to 
respond, but also for security reasons, as situations in a region on the opposite side of 
the globe can have menacing effects on other states.
39
 The increased need to intervene 
inside other countries, which can seemingly be a breach of sovereignty, has been 
exasperated by a growing fear, due to the rise in the level of difficulty of controlling up-
                                                          
38 Consult The Failed States Index 2012, (online) http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sortable retrieved on 
15/12/2013 





and-coming threats. There is a growing tendency, as Fukuyama notes, of reaching 
inside states, and this transforms conflicts. Parallel to this trend is the demand for liberal 
democracies to continue to diffuse democratic values and strengthen democratic 
legitimacy.  Fukuyama emphasizes that “weak governance undermines the principle of 
sovereignty on which the post-Westphalia international order has been built” 
(Fukuyama, 2004: 96), because outside powers will find reasons to intervene and solve 
the problems that are jeopardizing their own security. Following this line of reasoning 
one can interpret that weak and failed states are another source aggravating erosion of 
sovereignty, the position of the state and consequently a possibility of peace. This is 
why dealing with weak of failed states is of the most importance.    
Solving the problems of weak states poses a great challenge not only to outside powers 
but for the weak state itself particularly when it comes to peacebuilding.
40
 It is 
necessary to acknowledge that each state is outlined by its specific troubles, this makes 
dealing with weak states a complex task, as each state may require different solutions. 
As Holsti points out hostilities in weak states, much like legitimacy, are also a variable 
and not a constant. So it’s important to understand that not all weak states will display 
the same levels of hostilities, although in many cases several communities exist within a 
state, they are capable of co-existing peacefully, but hostility arises: 
“…from a variety of sources, among which are extended dominance of one 
group over another, exploitation, inequitable allocation or division of resources, 
and forced assimilation. Most “ethnic wars” are not the result of primordial 
hatreds but rather of state policies. Some states are weak precisely because they 
have (sometimes following colonial practice) established systems of social, 
economic, and political domination and injustice” ( Holsti 1996:107). 
                                                          
40 Creveld highlights that shifts in warfare can result in profound shifts in politics: “extensive conflict of this nature 
will cause existing distinctions between government, armed forces, and people to break down. National sovereignties 
are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state’s monopoly over armed violence. 
Armies will be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the 
difference is always clear even today. National frontiers, that at present constitute perhaps the greatest single obstacle 
to combating low-intensity conflict, may be obliterated or else become meaningless as rival organizations chase each 





However, as mentioned above, weak states tend to find themselves trapped in a vicious 
circle, facing what Holsti deems the state-strength dilemma. Holsti compares weak or 
failed states to sinking ships: 
“…some states may survive while others will founder and sink. It is not the 
weather on the sea – foreign predation or aggression – that is the cause of 
disaster, but the destructive actions of a country’s rulers and population. 
Foreign agents, however, are more than mute onlookers. They provide advice 
and material aid. They are actors in the contest for the state. And that contest 
frequently spills over into other jurisdictions. The state-strength dilemma leads 
to war within states; but sometimes it results in war between states as well. And, 
at a minimum, weak and failing states demand some sort of international 
response. The killing involved in “wars of a third kind” is not a matter of 
indifference to the onlookers. Genocide, wars of secession, communal war, and 
various forms of violent rebellion begin as national events but they soon 




Because the government can’t deliver the services and security needed to receive 
legitimacy, it attempts to cultivate strength by following predatory or kleptocratic 
practice or even tries to play upon the social tensions between the existing communities, 
and so: “everything it does to become a strong state actually perpetuates its weakness” 
(Holsti, 1996: 117). In a way, “new wars” can give out a sense of state disintegration 
because they tend to be inserted into an environment of weak states and thus are subject 
to the vicious cycle. So it is not clear whether “new wars” cause the state-disintegration 
or if state-disintegration paves the way for “new wars”.   
To overcome “new wars” it is indispensable for a civil society to re-emerge. One option 
could be to take advantage of the ‘islands of civility’ which offer a means of consulting 
civil society. In our view this concept should be explored because of its access to civil 
                                                          




society, which can constitute a starting focal point to develop important values such as 
trust and a sense of community and develop areas which offer a secure atmosphere: in 
hopes that in time the values will take root and spread. Here we agree with Kaldor, who 
considers these groups to offer the best solution, because they can serve as a basis for 
starting the arduous task of reconstruction. Reconstruction entails not only a rebuilding 
of political institutions, but of civil society itself, through: “…disarmament, 
demobilization, protection of the area, capture of war criminals, policing and/or 
establishing and training local police forces, and the restoration of the judiciary”( 
Kaldor, 2012: 146). It is an arduous task because one has to remove the atmosphere of 
fear and rebuild the sentiment of security
42
. By working closely with groups within the 
‘islands of civility’, one can acquire firsthand knowledge regarding the situation and the 
necessities of the population. However, civil society will always require a state; without 
the building of a state those small areas will remain simply islands.  
 Re-establishing peace inevitably requires a process of conflict resolution; however, 
given the multitude of players and interests, it can be hard to establish common ground 
or find a compromise
43
. Post-conflict reconstruction is not necessarily peaceful, and can 
be marked by a continuum of violence. Since the end of the Cold War and given the 
demands for peace-monitoring and peacebuilding, the United Nations has developed 
frameworks for the post-conflict environment
44
. The immediate priority and a great 
                                                          
42  There are a few attempts at describing the life-cycle of conflict using a graph-like illustration. The description of 
the life-cycle of conflict consulted for this dissertation was a diagram of the escalation and de-escalation of conflict 
from Contemporary Conflict Resolution by Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (which can be 
consulted Diagram 2.A at the appendixes) It is important to understand that violence does not erupt spontaneously, 
but is rooted in context; thus, it is possible to identify ‘symptoms’ that lead to physical violence.  
43 Charles Webel and Johan Galtung in Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, tackle the complexity of defining 
peace, managing conflict resolutions,  negotiating the end of conflicts and reconciling societies after conflicts. After 
the end of a conflict there is much to do in order to rebuild society; namely there is a need to rebuild trust and 
reconstruct relationships in order to prevent future recurrences.  
44 Tatiana Moura and Mónica Rafael in the magazine JANUS2005 reference a framework model used by the UN to 





challenge is the military and security dimension, which involves rebuilding the 
monopoly of force while the government’s legitimacy is not yet restored. However, in 
order to build legitimacy a secure environment must be re-established, and this requires 
a demilitarization of society and the consolidation of a national army. Building 
legitimacy is also a hard task that requires political and constitutional rehabilitation.  
When it comes to state-building, there are no quick fixes
45
.  
This increases the blurring of lines between legitimate interventions and interventions 
brought on by personal interests, raises several questions. No longer is, what Fukuyama 
refers to as the international community, simply labeling situations, such as Somalia, 
Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan as distant threats, by now take “…on a 
palpable presence as the effective government of the country in question” (Fukuyama, 
2004: 97) Furthermore, no longer can perpetrators of crimes against humanity hide 
under the cloak of principles of sovereignty. This illustrates that, brought on by the 
growing relevance of human rights, there has been a shift from an order that stressed 
state rights and adhered to a principle of non-intervention.  Lawrence Freedman, In 
War, raises an important Western concern: “if the Western states acquire a reputation 
for hesitation when it comes to intervention, then weak states which feel vulnerable to 
external threat must look to stronger local powers to protect them” (Freedman, 1994: 
361). This can result in an alteration of alliances or the formation of new ones that 
might further increase tensions and alter the order established in a given region. 
In order to understand and develop state-building or nation-building mechanisms
46
, it 
becomes crucial to deal with the new realities of conflict. The main concerns in weak 
                                                          
45 For further insight into the challenges of peacebuilding, consult online UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation. 
46 Fukuyama notes that there is a distinction between state-building and nation-building: “… nation-building in the 




states become how to uphold governance, construct self-sustaining institutions and, for 
those interested, generate democratic legitimacy.   
As Holsti had pointed out, in several cases it is the lack of unison between state and 
community that started the breach. State-building requires several stages which vary 
according to the nature of the conflict and instability affecting the country; but the 
question remains whether it is truly possible for outside powers to provide security, 
legitimacy and governance in weak and failed states. Fukuyama warns that the 
withering of the state is paving the path for disaster and what is needed is not the 
building up of extensive states but of effective states. Rather than simply relying on 
traditional military forces and components, present conflicts require a further 
understanding of the state and governance, which is what makes battling “new wars” so 
multifaceted. An outside power does not simply have to defeat the ‘enemy’, but has to 
rebuild the ‘enemy’s’ home in order to make him a possible future friend.   
This is the reason why Lawrence Freedman concludes that: 
“As much as by technology, war has been influenced by the changing character 
of the state system, including colonization and the rise of mass society, and then 
by decolonization and the integration of trade and finance in the West… But in a 
state system so complex and diverse and with such inequalities in wealth and 
territory, stability is no more than a fond hope. Things will never settle down, 
and that is why we are unlikely to be able to stop worrying about war” 
(Freedman, 1994: 363) 
 
In order to engage in successful conflict resolution, it is thus indispensable to know the 
society. This includes how society operates, how the communities within that society 
                                                                                                                                                                          
outside power to achieve… only states can be deliberately constructed. If a nation arises from this, it is more a matter 





deal with each other; understanding the patterns of authority within that society and how 
significant actors interact with each other. Mediators need to interact with the society at 
its core civil society level by working with the population, because the probability of 
conflict resolution being effective rises if mediators are able to find allies within the 
society. Accordingly “new wars” might have the potential to catalyze state-
disintegration, but, the outcome of the conflict might lead to state-building and in a long 
term create a stronger state: but for this to occur “new wars” must be dealt with 
effectively.    
The state is facing new circumstances and threats, in the present world context, and its 
stability as we have known since the Westphalia is being questioned. Although it seems 
the foundations of the state are being challenged and some authors advocate the 
phenomena of state erosion, at the present time the state remains a solid reference in the 
international state acting as a crucial puzzle piece in upholding international security. 
Weak and failed states are at the center of the international agenda and pose captivating 
new challenges, as they bring to light legitimacy crisis, problems of bag governance and 
lack of strong institutional infrastructures. These concerns are intrinsically related to the 
character of conflict under “new wars” rhetoric.  But state demise is far from being an 
inevitable outcome, as “new wars” can also be an opportunity to dedicate international 








Chapter III: Case Study Bosnia-Herzegovina 
“The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be considered one of those defining events in which entrenched 
political assumptions, strategic thinking and international arrangements are both challenged and 
reconstructed.” 
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars 
 
3.1- Why Explore the Bosnia-Herzegovina Case? 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 1992 to October 1995 was chosen as the 
case study for this dissertation for three reasons. Firstly, Kaldor perceived it as the “… 
archetypal example, the paradigm of the new post-Cold War type of warfare”( 2012:32). 
and defends that it was a defining event which mobilized a vast international effort and 
weighed on global consciousness, and in which: “…entrenched political assumptions, 
strategic thinking and international arrangements are both challenged and 
reconstructed” (2012;33). Secondly, Bosnia-Herzegovina is part of a European region 
which holds great significance for the European project; geographically it is placed 
between East and West, and could be used as a strategic bridge. Finally, Portugal was 
involved directly in the peacekeeping missions, sending Portuguese soldiers into the 
field to monitor the situation for several years.
47
 Having Portuguese forces stationed in 
Bosnia also illustrates and represents the magnitude of international involvement in the 
local conflict. Our reflection will be based primarily on Kaldor’s analysis of this 
conflict, because the view she presents is a good defense of how the Bosnian conflict is 
an excellent example of “new wars”. This case study is important to understanding 
“new wars” because it shows how increasingly conflicts require more than military 
                                                          
47 For more information regarding the influence of the Portuguese military in an active involvement in monitoring the 
conflict consult the journal JANUS 2005,Portugal e as Missões de Paz na Ex- Jugoslávia. In 1992 Portugal had 
assumed the Presidency of the European Community, being compelled to alter its  external policy from a more 
detached position to a stronger involvement in international and European affairs: sending from January 1996 to 




victory to be solved. Instead, they require a mobilization of different state dimensions, 
in order to address the issues underlying the tensions driving the conflict, which tend to 
be more complex. The ceasefire only managed to stop the fighting by partitioning the 
country, but did not solve the roots of the conflict, and to date Bosnia requires a vast 
involvement of international forces to endure.  
3.2-The Long-term and Short-term Causes of the Bosnian-Herzegovina War 
The Balkans is a region known for its plurality of ethnicities, which mix into a complex 
puzzle of ancient clashes, divisions and rivalries. The term ‘Balkanization’ is used to 
describe the unique nature of this region, which is marked by different cultures that 
throughout history were subject to fluid borders which shifted – examples are the 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. This is the view that prevailed among the 
European outsiders looking in, so it was with this perception that the war was 
understood. It was seen as being caused by the ancient ethnic divisions and by the 
inherent peculiar aggressive nationalism the Balkans seemed to nurture. Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was the state with the largest ethnic assortment. In 1991, the country was 
composed of Muslims (43.7 %), Serbs, (31.4%), and Croats (17.3%)
48
. The main 
difference between the ethnic groups was religion: the Serbs were Orthodox and the 
Croats were Roman (consult Map 1 in appendix).  Ethnic differences are referenced as 
being the cause behind the conflict, but Kaldor highlights that the war was also fought 
because of political goals. The main parties behind the conflict were the nationalists 
who controlled the National Assembly, having received 70% of the votes in the first 
election in 1990: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) which was the Muslim 
nationalist party, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic 
                                                          






. Kaldor is quick to point out that it is not enough to blame nationalism, 
because this does not explain why there are long periods of peaceful coexistence 
followed by waves nationalism triggered at specific times. For Kaldor, the reason 
behind the outburst of nationalism which triggered the war was constructed for political 
purposes: 
“The emergence of virulent nationalism, which did indeed construct itself on the 
basis of certain traditional social divisions and prejudices… has to be understood 
in terms of the struggle, on the part of increasingly desperate (and corrupt) elites, 
to control remnants of the state combined with growing economic insecurity and 
the loss of self-worth associated with that insecurity that made people vulnerable 
to ideas about national identity” (Kaldor, 2012: 36) 
 
One word that stands out is insecurity. The breakdown of Yugoslavia was 
fundamentally a disintegration of the state on a federal level, and in the cases of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, at the republican level
50
 (consult Map 2 in appendix).  
Following Weber’s definition of what makes a state, what happened then was that both 
legitimacy and the monopoly of legitimate force broke down as the Yugoslav National 
Army – JNA – stopped being the bedrock of Yugoslavia in 1991. The environment of 
insecurity that surrounds the breakdown of states is very dangerous because it leaves the 
population vulnerable, scared and at times desperate. Kaldor points out that this form of 
nationalism was associated more with state-disintegration than with state-building, as 
other spurts of nationalism had been. Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by European 
States as independent on April 1992. But for Kaldor, “the state was recognized at the 
                                                          
49 Each party had its own goals, ranging from political and ethnic division to partition, and for some authors even 
‘ethnic cleansing’- ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ is defined by the UN Commission of Expert’s as:  “Considered in the context 
of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ’ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using 
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is contrary to international 
law.”  Final Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674, 
27 May 1994, vol.I, annex IV, par. 84. 
50 Yugoslavia was divided into six states: Serbia (within Serbia there were two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and 





very moment of its disintegration” (2012: 45). This is an interesting notion of a state’s 
formation being marked by the initial loss of legitimacy and with no legitimate 
monopoly of force. For Kaldor: “…the war could be viewed as a war of exclusivist 
nationalist against a secular multicultural pluralistic society” (Kaldor, 2012:45) Charles 
G. Boyd, in “Making Peace With the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia”(1995) goes even 
further claiming that the: “war in Bosnia and Croatia was not the inevitable product of 
centuries of ethnic hatreds. It was created from ambition, fear and incompetence – local 
and international.” 
As seen in previous chapters, the origins of this case strongly connect with the 
breakdown of the state; thus the conflict fits the characteristics that have been associated 
with “new wars”.
51
 The conflict was fostered in an environment where the state was 
weak – in this case it had disintegrated – and there was a great loss of legitimacy and a 
total breakdown of the monopoly of violence. Thus the vacuum that was left was filled 
by a multitude of parties with independent and clashing political goals. As a result 
society was left at the mercy of parties that did not represent the views of society, but 
rather those of individual groups. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized as a 
state, within it there were various communities that did not identify themselves with the 
designed state.  
3.3-Fighthing “New Wars”  
Kaldor notes that the Bosnia-Herzegovina war was also a product of the collapse of the 
Yugoslav military and industrial compound. Outside the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was 
the most militarized country in Europe, with military spending until 1986 at 4% of 
GNP, a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) made up of 70,000 regulars and 150,000 
                                                          
51 It is worth differentiating between ‘breakdown’ and ‘erosion’. Erosion is a gradual, slow progress; breakdown a 




conscripts, and each republic and autonomous province its own Territorial Defence 
Units (TOs) (Kaldor, 2012:46). From 1986 to 1991, military spending decreased from 
$US2,491 million in constant 1988 prices to $US1,376 (Kaldor, 2012:46), the Yugoslav 
National Army broke down as the Yugoslav symbol into several regular and irregular 
forces (1991), and so did the Territorial Defence Units.
52
 When the war broke out in 
1992, Bosnia had no national army, but a “bewildered” assortment of military and 
paramilitary forces
53
. Territorial defense was organized locally, which shows how the 
monopoly of force was not present: 
“Sarajevo was defended by a motley crew of patriotic leagues and other 
paramilitary groups, largely organized by the Sarajevo underground. Tuzla was 
defended by the local police force augmented by a locally organized patriotic 
league. Although Izetbegović announced the formation of a regular army in May 
1992, it was not until Silajdžić became prime minister in the autumn of 1993 that 
the various gangster groups were controlled and the army command was 
centralized” (Kaldor, 2012:47)  
 
In addition to the three regular forces – BSA, HVO and ABiH – eighty-three 
paramilitary groups were identified by the United Nations Commission of Experts: 
fifty-six were Serbian, with an estimated size of 20,000-40,000; thirteen Croatian, with 
an estimated size of 12,000-20,000; and fourteen were Bosnian, with an estimated size 
of 4,000-6,000 (Kaldor, 2012:48). Two of the best known Serbian groups were Arkan’s 
Tigers
54
 and Šešelj’s Chetniks. On the Croatian side the best known paramilitary groups 
were the HOS (paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of Rights-HSP), and the 
                                                          
52  Data information from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI year book 1992: World 
Armaments and Disarmament. (Kaldor, 2012:46) 
53 Towards the end of the conflict, each party’s forces became more centralized and organized, giving way to three 
main regular forces: Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), Croatian Defence Council (HVO), Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(ABiH) 
54 Arkan’s real name was Željko Ražnjatović. They were a well-armed group with access to tanks and were initially 
active in Croatia.  Šešelj’s Chetniks also began operating in Croatia. Both groups are said to have worked together 






. On the Bosnian side there were groups called Green Berets or Muslim 
Armed Forces (MOS), which are said to have worked under the administration of 
ABiH. Other paramilitary groups were the Black Swans, Yellow Ants, Mosque Pigeons, 
Knights, and Serbian Falcons. In addition to paramilitary forces, there were also foreign 
mercenary groups and local police forces in unison with armed civilians. Two known 
gangsters were Caco and Celo, who operated in Sarajevo until 1993. 
From day one, the multitude of military forces were dependent on outside assistance, 
through support from other governments, ‘taxation’ of humanitarian assistance and 
payments from individuals, and with regular forces equipped by sponsor governments. 
During the war, the regular economy collapsed, and combined with a sense of 
insecurity, this left individual people to battle for their own survival: 
“For the most part, people faced a painful choice: they could live insufficiently 
of humanitarian aid; they could volunteer for the army or become criminal or 
both; or they could try to leave.” (Kaldor, 2012:51) 
 
The choices people had reflected the method the irregular forces were adopting: using 
political control through violence and the diffusion of fear and hate to ensure territorial 
gain by controlling populations. The main method was not military offensives. The war 
was directed at the civilian population, so there was no continuous front, but a “… 
‘chequered’ military map” (Kaldor, 2012:52). 
The Bosnian Serbs, who wanted an autonomous Serb territory within Bosnia, aimed at 
establishing ‘Serb autonomous areas’, but since the only area where they were 
                                                          





numerically dominant was Banja Luka, they decided to engage in ethnic cleansing
56
. 
The typical pattern of taking over an area was as follows: 
“First, regular forces would shell the area and issue frightening propaganda so as 
to instill a mood of panic. Reports of terror in neighboring villages would add to 
the panic. Then the paramilitary forces would close in and terrorize the non 
Serbs residents with random killing, rape and looting. Control over local 
administration would then be established. In the more extreme cases, non-Serb 
men were separated from the women and killed or taken to detention centers. 
Women were robbed and/or raped and allowed to go or taken to special rape 
detention centers
57
. (Kaldor, 2012:53) 
 
Like Kaldor, Bell-Fialkoff highlights there were massive population transfers and from 
the start it was fear itself that generated a large number of refugees. It was not only 
ethnic groups who were seen as targets, but anyone who refused to engage in the 
mindset of hating, as for example the moderates who tried to help opposing ethnic 
group individuals. According to Bell-Fialkoff, at the start of 1992 there were 158,000 
refugees in Serbia; within one month of Bosnia’s declaration of independence around 
420,000 people fled from Bosnia or were forced out
58
 (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993:118). It is 
useful to look at Table 3.A in the appendix, which illustrates the effects of ethnic 
cleansing, showing how population figures were affected. 
Apart from fanatics with nationalist motivations, paramilitary groups were largely 
motivated by economic aims. Warlords organized, many criminals groups, expanded 
their networks, and paramilitary groups were closely linked to black-market activities, 
at times cooperating across supposed confrontation lines in order to gain greater 
                                                          
56 As Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, in “A brief History of Ethnic Cleansing”, puts it, “…a population must move or die” 
(1993 111) 
57 According to Bell-Fialkoff the number of women raped is estimated to range from 30,000 to 50,000. (Bell-Fialkoff, 
1993:119) “ …As the stigma of rape was seen to be effective in driving away women and their families from the 
lands that Serbs  sought to conquer, rape indeed became a new and gruesome weapon in ancient quiver of ethnic 
cleansing” (bell-Fialkoff, 1993:120). Rape is not an uncommon phenomena in wartime, but it is deplorable and 
repulsive to see how in this case rape was organized, to the extent that women were deliberately sent to rape camps.  
58 Bell-Fialkoff introduces a concept of “voluntary” refugees, but given that they left out of fear, one can not consider 




benefits. Again, economic gains are seen as a motivation for prolonging the state of war 
by: “…creating a self-sustaining logic to the war both to maintain lucrative sources of 
income and to protect criminals from legal processes” (Kaldor, 2012:56). The areas in 
which the situation was better were the places where the local state apparatus managed 
to survive – Tuzla is an example.
59
  
The multitude of players that entered the warfare scheme mirrors the vast number of 
sides that can be found in “new wars”. Moreover, there is a breakdown of the economic 
sector, which is replaced by irregular markets and allows for individuals, and certain 
groups, to benefit from the continuation of warfare. The main target becomes civilians, 
who can’t find security and have to struggle to survive by adapting to the state-of-war 
environment. With no isolated battlefront, there is no place to hide, except perhaps what 
Kaldor has called ‘islands of civility’, which try to remain grounded in the midst of 
chaos – in this case Tuzla, which benefited from having a semi-functioning state 
apparatus. Population displacement and the increased number of refugees are also 
known as consequences of “new wars”, which add to the international dimension. As 
Kaldor emphasizes, ethnic cleansing weighs on global consciousness and requires an 
international response.  This is how such local conflicts make for an international crisis.   
3.4-What was the Level of International Participation? 
The international involvement was extensive, ranging from an official level to civil 
society, attracting media attention and the focus of humanitarian and civic institutions. 
For Kaldor these were two types of international participation: one at the high level of 
political talks and missions; the other as a new form of humanitarian intervention. 
                                                          
59 Kaldor explains that Tuzla: “…was defended by the local police and local volunteers, who later became a local 
brigade of the Bosnian army, and an ideology of multicultural civic values was vigorously promoted. Throughout the 




Although Kaldor praises the innovation at the humanitarian intervention level, given the 
scale of mobilization and the magnitude of cooperation between international 
institutions and civil society. This was hampered by the lack of consistency in the high-
level political talks and the simultaneous misconceptions about the political and military 
nature of the Bosnian war. It is worth noting that the increased presence of international 
organizations and institutions as new actors in “new wars” conflicts is also a growing 
trend.  
In an article written for JANUS 2005, Carlos Branco, points out how important it is to 
know societies before engaging in peacekeeping or peace building missions. Moreover, 
he echoes Kaldor’s criticism that the Bosnian conflict was not correctly understood. In 
particular the multitude of players and the different views were disregarded, which led 
to the exclusion of relevant non-political actors during peace talks.
60
  For Kaldor, 
international agents lacked the necessary knowledge of why and how the war was 
fought. The view that persisted was that it was a conflict between competing 
nationalisms, but this approach failed to understand how it was a war against the 
civilian population itself and that fear and hate was endemic to Bosnian society, rather 
than tactics used by nationalists. Nationalists were seen as representing society, so to 
‘solve’ the conflict it was necessary for international negotiators to compromise with 
the various nationalist factions. In military terms the war was seen as a clash between 
the different nationalist groups where civilians were just caught in the crossfire. 
 In this context it is helpful to take note that Bell-Fialkoff points out, ethnic cleansing 
was mostly carried out by irregular civilian forces, so the fighting was deeply rooted in 
the core of civil society and civilians directly participated in the war. Kaldor argues that 
                                                          




ethnic cleansing was seen as a side-effect and not as a goal of war. However, a Report 
submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights) we are reminded that: “ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the 
consequence of war but rather its target.”
61
  
Even though ethnic cleansing evoked strong moral responses from international 
observers, Kaldor highlights there was a preoccupation with international forces getting 
dragged into conventional warfare, so from the start a clear distinction was drawn 
between peacekeeping and war-fighting. Kaldor points out that the approach that guided 
high-level political talks was a realpolitik perception, which assumed the leaders spoke 
for the rest of the population, and so the conflict was understood as a problem of 
borders and territory rather than one of political and social organization. After a long, 
arduous and tumultuous negotiation process, the result was the Dayton Agreement
62
. 
Thus, although international agents could not turn a blind eye to the situation, they 
wanted to refrain from getting engulfed in the warfare, and wanted to solve the problem 
as fast as possible through negotiation with the nationalist parties.
63
  
Charles G. Boyd, in the Foreign Affairs article “Making Bosnia Work”, advances that 
The Dayton Agreement did not stop the fighting in Bosnia, but instead froze an uneasy 
                                                          
61 The same paragraph goes on: “The Special Rapporteur shares the view of other observers that the principal 
objective of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnically-homogenous 
regions…This goal, to a large extent, has already been achieved through killings, beatings, rape, destructions of 
houses and threats. Such practices have intensified in recent weeks and there is less resistance on the part of the non-
Serbian population, increasing numbers of whom are ready to abandon everything and to flee their homeland. Recent 
events observed in the region of Prijedor, Doboj and Kotor Varos prove that Serbian leaders in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are not ready to desist in their plans. The Muslim and Croatian populations, in the territory controlled by 
Serbian authorities, live under enormous pressure and terror. Hundreds of thousands of people are being forced to 
leave their homes and to abandon their belongings in order to save their lives”. Report on the situation of human 
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, (online) United Nations, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, 27 October 1992, par.6  
62 In an interview to Foreign Affairs, David Owen62 clearly states that the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia posed: “…the 
biggest moral problem for the world since the Holocaust (1993:4). However, “it was clear by the end of August 1992 
that there was no will in any of the major Western nations to take up arms against Serbian expansionism” 
(idem,1993:2), so the only option was negotiations. 





cease-fire in place to prevent the resumption of hostilities.
64
 Behind the successful 
implementation of the agreement, Boyd attributes much of the success to the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Moreover, a number of organizations and institutions were 
involved in implementing the agreement: United Nations, the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU). 
Kaldor concludes that if the war had been understood from the start as one of genocide, 
the priority would have been the protection of civilian populations and not partition. 
The massive humanitarian effort represented a potentially new form of 
humanitarianism, but at the same time not all measures were effectively implemented, 
and Kaldor criticizes the way humanitarian aid was persistently blocked and taxed by 
warring parties, the safe areas remained insecure refugee camps, and war crimes were 
continuously committed, with some of the worst instances of ethnic cleansing 
performed in the last few months of war. For Kaldor, the best alternative in this 
situation would have been the implementation of humanitarian law-enforcement
65
. 
In order to successfully address levels of conflicts, it is important to understand the 
latter’s nature. The multitude of players and interests make an accurate reading difficult 
and negotiations more challenging. Balancing the level of military and humanitarian 
interventions has become a crucial dilemma, as peacekeeping, peace-building and 
peace-monitoring become daily realties on the international stage. Humanitarian 
assistance is a new, dynamic and engaging dimension of “new wars”, and international 
                                                          
64 “Dayton was a brilliantly negotiated agreement to support a dubious objective: the creation of a nation where no 
common sense of national community existed” ( G. Boyd, 1998:43). 
65 “It requires new strategic thinking about how to counter strategies of population control though ethnic cleansing – 
how to develop support and promote alternative sources of legitimacy among the local population, new rules of 
engagement and norms of behavior, appropriate equipment, forms of organization and command structures” (Kaldor, 




participation which translates into the presence and involvement of an array of 
institutions in local conflicts is a recurring issue.  
3.5-After The Dayton Agreement: The Challenge of State-building 
For Kaldor, the nationalists were the winners of the war. The Dayton Agreement 
divided Bosnia into three statelets
66
 (see appendixes for Map 3) and committed the 
parties and the international agents to adhere to human-rights clauses, the prosecution of 
war criminals, return of refugees, freedom of movement and economic and social 
reconstruction. As Ivo H. Daalder and Michael B.G Froman emphasize, in “ Dayton’s 
Incomplete Peace”, the post-Dayton Bosnian reality is very intricate, and although the 
country has overcome a lot of challenges, it has done so and continues to do so because 
of the international input from other states: 
“Whatever progress has been achieved in Bosnia is due to the untiring efforts of 
foreign soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers to provide security for all 
individuals, to cajole and persuade the country’s leaders to move forward one 
small step at a time, and to assist in the rebuilding of the physical and 
psychological infrastructure that was devastated … Instead of moving toward 
self-sustaining peace and economic growth, the country’s economy, politics, and 
even its security remain firmly dependent on foreign, rather than Bosnian, 
efforts” (Daalder and Froman, 1999: 107) 
  
The level of international participation in post-war Bosnia was so deep that authors such 
as Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, in “Travails of the European Raj”, criticize the 
wholesale interference of international agents at all levels of the country’s internal 
political life, including shaping and imposing the political agenda and imposing 
                                                          
66 “Formally, Bosnia was divided into two entities – Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 




sanctions on those who don’t implement it
67
, all of which they see as a breach of 
sovereignty.  
The military dimension was more effective than the civilian dimension, as militaries 
were able to control the logic of partition. Building up civil society is always the hardest 
part, has taken years, and is still under reconstruction today. Kaldor explains that the 
civilian side started its slow build-up with an attempt to integrate the three communities 
through the integration of armies, police reforms, creating a common currency and flag, 
the dismissal of extremist politicians, support for moderate democratic or civic 
politicians, and ensuring freedom of movement.  However, the economy has never fully 
recovered and democratic structures remain very weak, as Kaldor explains: “the trauma 
of the war left a trail of fear and insecurity, guilt and mistrust – emotions that cannot 




One clear way in which daily life in Bosnia drastically developed was the way the sense 
of insecurity no longer dominates daily life, even though ethnic divisions remain. 
Recovering a sense of security, which usually involves restoring the monopoly of 
violence, is seen as a short-term goal and one of the first priorities of state-building. The 
increased sense of security leads to the return of refugees. However, Dayton’s long-term 
goal of creating a multiethnic, democratic and economically sustainable country 
remains a challenge.  
                                                          
67 “The experience of Bosnia shows the ease with which a state-building mission may start out with unlimited powers 
to meet extraordinary circumstances and end up as an uncomfortable caricature of a Utilitarian despot… Any post-
conflict mission that aims to establish democratic governance and the rule of law must institutionalize checks and 
balances on the use of extraordinary powers at the very outset.” (Kanus and Martin, 2003:73)  
68 Authors such as Philippe C Schmitter, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, who analyze the transitions to 




Freedom House, Nation in Transit 2012 data (Table 3.B, Graph 3.C and Graph 3.D 
found in the appendixes) show how Bosnian society still scores poor results in relation 
to certain key elements of a democratic society. Ethnic and ideological differences 
continue to mark political life and corruption is still strongly institutionalized. 
As Boyd argues, building trust is an arduous task and takes a long time. To develop 
trust within Bosnian society, it must itself take a hands-on approach and stop relying on 
international support.
69
 Bosnians need to take their future into their own hands, because 
it is by themselves that they can create a multiethnic democratic and economically 
sustainable state.  
In terms of measuring freedom ratings, civil liberties and political rights there has been 
slow progress, with Freedom House awarding Partly Free status – an improvement from 
Not Free, (see Table 3.F in appendix). Graph 3.G
70
 below shows that Bosnia has 
conserved its status as a Partly Free country, but with no real significant improvements 
in political rights or civil liberties: the scores continue to fluctuate between five, four 
and three. This graph was constructed and included to show that progress until the 





                                                          
69 For Professor Dieter Senghaas, in order to build peace and rebuild a society, one has to follow what he called the 
‘Civilizing Hexagon’. Senghaas depicts peace as a civilizing process, and his ‘Civilizing Hexagon’ is composed of 
six concepts; monopoly of aggression, Constitutional State System, Democratic Participation, Culture of Conflict, 
Social Justice and Interdependency and Control of Emotions. The image of the Hexagon can be found in the 
appendixes (Illustration 3.E) 














State-building is a laborious task, but has become an intrinsic dimension of “new wars”.  
In a small box reflection entitled Bosnia, Nine years after Dayton, in his article “A 
Gestão de Conflitos intra-Estado: a necessidade de novas abordagens”, Carlos Branco, 
concludes that the end of violence does not determine that the conflict is indeed 
resolved. Bosnia is a unified state more in theory than in practice, as the core problems 
were never truly addressed and territorial partition only appeased hostilities. Military 
intervention in post-Dayton Bosnia helped ensure security and fulfilled some necessary 
short-term goals, but long-term needs are work in progress. This means that we still 
don’t know if the international forces might reconcile the three communities.   
We could sum up by saying the Bosnia-Herzegovina war is a good example of “new 
wars” because it had global, regional and local consequences; there were a multitude of 
players involved who pursued their own interests; there was a practical and moral 





cleansing” had a significant influence; the causes of the war where linked with problems 
of governance and state-disintegration; even though the fighting stopped in 1995 it is 
undergoing a long process of state-building and attempting to reconcile the different 
communities within the state. Furthermore, to date, Bosnian society requires a major 



















“Dear Teacher,  
I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness: Gas chambers built 
by learned engineers; Children poisoned by educated physicians; Infants killed by trained nurses; Women 
and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So, I am suspicious of education. My 
request is: help students become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled 
psychopaths, educated Eichmanns.  Reading, writing, arithmetic and history are important only if they 




 War should not be perceived as a blunt instrument, and it is an illusion to see it as a 
precise device that can inflict surgical political damage, because conflict is very hard to 
control. The character of warfare is transformed by socio-cultural, political, economic 
and technological progress. “New wars” can be depicted as a contemporary paradigm of 
war, but one should not disregard past knowledge and focus merely on present conflicts.  
The reasons Thucydides enumerated as motivations for going to war – fear, honor and 
interest – are still relevant and can be identified within “new wars”. Similarly, although 
some authors’ claim that Clausewitz’s teaching is no longer relevant, it is nonetheless 
important to understand that new theories arise from the foundations of previous ones, 
and we cannot exclude historical experience. On War may not be infallible, but remains 
a good source from which to educate and investigate the complex subject of warfare.   
“New wars” is a highly controversial theory. One of the main criticisms is that they are 
not new. Although the characteristics found in “new wars” have occurred in some way 
or another, at one time or another, the way these characteristics are presenting 
themselves gives “new wars” a specific dynamic and structure. Still, describing them as 
Contemporary Conflicts/Wars could work better, rather than falling prey to the word 
                                                          
71Quote retrieved from GCSE Modern World History,  A letter written by a Holocaust survivor to the United Nations 





new. “New Wars” can be interpreted, as Matt Killingsworth does, as a continuation of 
modern conflict. Moreover it is important to emphasize, the way Hoffman and Weiss 
do, that the “s” in “new wars” can serve to illustrate the multitude of realities within a 
single conflict.  
As was explored in Chapter I, “new wars” are characterized by having a greater 
delimitation, duration and area of influence, in which warfare loses its militarily defined 
contours; a multitude of actors participate in the conflict; there is a greater influence 
from globalization, which translates into new economic effects among others; civilians 
have become direct military targets and children are increasingly dragged into war as 
child soldiers. In parallel to the development of these characteristics it is worth 
emphasizing the impact of the dramatic changes in technology and how the new global 
media and scrutiny have gained increased influence over the conduct of and response to 
conflicts: this is a recent global phenomenon, which requires a certain level of adaption 
as the socio-cultural dimension expands in importance to match the weight of the 
political context of conflicts.  
A number of essential points can be emphasized from Chapter I. Military superiority 
does not ensure victory. When the state leaves a vacuum, new actors quickly surface to 
take its place. In addition to political and social motivations, new actors are also driven 
by economic stimuli, placing greed over grieve. At times, warlords can be depicted as 
businessman of war. The combination of warlords’ interests and people’s need to 
survive gives rise to expanding forms of economic activity: shadow globalization. As 
Duffield identifies, the outcome is that the whole society suffers for individual gain. 
This makes finding resolutions harder, as conflicts have a greater privatization and 




punished in peacetime go unpunished, and one can identify how the lines between war 
and crime become blurred. So war continues as long as particular benefits persist. 
Distinct transnational characteristics are present in “new wars”, which are marked by 
regional networks of trade/refugees, which link different countries and bond official and 
unofficial actors together.  It is important to understand that war economies are not self-
sustained and there is a need for external factors/support.  
Kaldor identifies the promulgation of fear and hatred as the key methods of political 
control that then allow for a rapid spread of violence. The result is the consolidation of 
an insecure environment that leaves people vulnerable, and in the absence of a 
protective state, individuals feel they have to fend for themselves. Consequently, 
individuals turn to violence for a better future, as with child soldiers. Others are forced 
out of their homes or flee in fright, which leads to an increase of refugees, causing “new 
wars” to entail major population displacement.  Lastly, Chapter I reflected on the 
International Humanitarian Law, which is a developing dimension and has a practical 
need to adapt to “new wars”, as people think about how to monitor “new wars” and to 
apply established international laws.   
Kaldor sees “new wars” as wars of state-disintegration, while Duffield portrays them as 
network wars and associates them with a process of social transformation and an 
emergence of new forms of authority and zones of alternative regulation. It is clear that 
“new wars” is a very multifaceted form of conflict, nurtured by a series of variables and 
is prolonged by a multitude of factors. “New wars” is a product of an array of elements 
(presence of different communities, which fell threatened; ethnic tensions as different 
groups want to advance their economic, political and social interests), in a specific 




government and of the monopoly of force, and a growing incapacity of the government 
to provide a sense of security, be it social, political or economic), which allows new 
actors to fill the vacuum left by the government’s failings.  The difficulty lies in the fact 
that once “new wars” start, they create an environment that becomes hostile to the 
rebuilding of the state, as the monopoly of force and legitimacy break down further. 
Insecurity rules the lives of individuals, who struggle to survive as new actors target 
civilians to maintain a context of disorder for their own benefit. One can thus consider 
“new wars” as more political than military confrontations, because they are about the 
fracture of legitimacy and security (the state).  
The state was the central theme in Chapter II, which explored the erosion of 
sovereignty. One can establish that state is still indispensable, it can make war and 
chaos, but it also makes peace and brings order. With the growing presence of new 
international actors, the state needs to continue to reassert itself as a central entity. This 
can be done by individual states upholding legitimacy, the monopoly of force and 
meeting societies’ needs for protection. Only through successful practice can the state 
defend itself against external and internal dangers. Moreover, as Van Creveld warns, 
weak or failed states need to overcome their internal conflicts in order to fruitfully 
endure. Holsti emphasizes that war has increasingly become related not with problems 
between states, but security concerns within states: states do not automatically equal 
community. Conflicts arise out of issues of statehood, governance and the status of 
communities: state stability. Problems of legitimacy cannot be ignored, because they are 
central to the perpetuation of the state. Furthermore, trust cannot flourish in 
environments governed by fear, and criminal violence blooms best in a social context of 




in a vacuum; they are nurtured by political, social and economic contexts when interests 
are threatened.  
Weak and failed states are a source of conflict and human rights-abuse and are potential 
ground for proliferation of terrorism, so state-building is vital to international security. 
At the center of today’s international agenda are the problems of state-maintenance and 
state failure: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding. It is 
important to remember that acquiring freedom does not immediately make a state viable 
– the various problems with democratic transitions are examples of this. In addition, the 
sovereign state can be seen as a prerequisite to institute democracy.  
 State-building is a possible way of overcoming “new wars”. The population needs to 
feel protected and this requires a sense of security brought about by restoration of the 
monopoly of force. It becomes more imperative to shield civilians than to kill 
belligerents.  Because there is no longer a specific battleground, the whole of the 
civilian population is involved in the battlefield. To rebuild a society, it is necessary to 
understand how that society works. It is not only strategic and military intelligence that 
matter, there is a need to comprehend historical, cultural political roots: there is a need 
to develop some sort of civil society strategy. When it comes to battling “new wars”, it 
seems more effective to fight them by adapting to their character rather than using 
tactics for other type of warfare. One of the most interesting state-building ideas 
advanced by Kaldor is the concept of ‘islands of civility’, which seems like a gateway 
into civil society. In the end “new wars” can be promoters of state-disintegration but 





The Bosnia-Herzegovina case study in Chapter III is a conclusive explanation for the 
idea that the clashes between participants do not occur in a vacuum; they are nurtured 
by political, social and economic contexts. Bosnia is also a great example of how a state 
is not necessarily one community, and how conflicts arose from issues of statehood, 
governance and the status of communities. Moreover it portrays that the end of warfare 
does not solve the underlying tensions that lead to its outbreak. To effectively deal with 
“new wars” ending the violence is just the first step of a long and arduous process. 
The aim of this dissertation was to reflect upon the impact “new wars” have on the state, 
with the focus on one key questions: What type of state is more likely to struggle with 
“new wars”? The hypotheses was that weak or failed states offer the most fruitful 
ground for “new wars” to sprout and be nurtured, and that “new wars” disrupt the basic 
elements of the state, according to Max Weber,– legitimacy and the monopoly of force 
– consequently breaking down the guarantee of security. This seems accurate in the 
light of research and conclusions gathered throughout the dissertation.  
At first glance the reader might presume he/she has just read a thesis about war, which 
in part is true. Nonetheless, this exposition is concerned with the search for peace. In an 
invigorating venture this dissertation wanted to investigate the “new wars” thesis, to 
explore the possible contemporary character of warfare, but, always with the reasoning 
that the greater comprehension of “new wars” could lead to more proficient ways of 
fashioning peace. George Orwell portrayed a world where the state (The Party and Big 
Brother) was absolute as it destroyed humanity to propagate internal power. In “new 
wars” the state is disintegrated at the wishes of individuals who want to achieve their 




regard for human dignity. Both realities offer a bleak image of humanity, but these are 
not the only choices.  
The state remains a central entity for the political and social organization of 
communities and as such holds an indispensable place in the international system. As 
“new wars” strive in weak or failed states, it is vital to focus peace efforts directed at 
state-building: it is not about placing the state above individuals, but for individuals to 
use the state as an instrument for order, security and peace. Freedom does not have to 
equate slavery, and slavery does not have to equate freedom. War can present an 
opportunity to destroy or a chance to create it is not about abolishing war. It is about 










Chapter I: Characterizing “New Wars” 
 
Table 1.A: Practical Examples of “New Wars” and their Individual Characteristics 













Civilians Small arms  
Liberia Internal but 
crosses 
borders 














Small arms  
Bosnia Breakdown of 




































































Note: This table is simply a thumbnail sketch to offer an overview. It is by no means 
exhaustive. But it does illustrate how, although each conflict was different, there were 
common characteristics that fall within the “new wars” structure.  
Source: (Hoffman and Weiss,2006:79) 
 
 
Table 1.B: The number of Intrastate and Interstate Conflicts by Intensity from 2010 to 
2003 (excluding 2006) 

































57 52 58 50 41 41 42 38 31 34 37 40 34 41 
Manifest 
Conflict 
64 36 78 36 87 42 72 46 52 34 43 23 34 29 
Crisis 120 6 106 6 88 7 93 6 71 3 48 3 9 9 
Severe 
Crisis 
22 0 24 0 30 0 25 0 22 0 33 0 2 2 
War 6 0 7 0 8 1 6 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 
 
Note: This table is of my authority. The year 2006 was excluded from consideration 
because a new term was added only in that year (transnational), seeming ambiguous and 
could interfere with the results.  












Graph 1.C:    The number of Intrastate and Interstate Conflicts by intensity from 2011 
and 2012  
 
Note: This graph is of my authority. 














Graph 1.D: Graph to Show the Numbers of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
















Chapter II: State and Governance: Political legitimacy, Monopoly of 
Force and Guarantee of Security 
 










Note: We can see from the diagram above that although the peak of the conflict is 
during the stage of war, conflict starts when there is an environment of unstable peace 
(contradiction; polarization). Thus, the process of escalation of violence is very complex 
and dynamic. Peace is not a consequence of stopping the fighting (war stage); rather, 
durable peace after the conflict can only be achieved by accepting that one has to deal 
with the de-escalating stages of the conflict. De-escalation can also be paved with 
several setbacks. For each stage of the conflict, there are tools that can be used to 
prevent conflicts from escalating into the stage of war.  










Table 2.B: The European Commission Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict 
Early Warning Indicator Question that Should be Asked 
Legitimacy of the State  Are there proper checks and balances in 
the political system? 
 How inclusive is the 
political/administrative power? 
 What is the overall level of respect for 
national authorities? 
 Is corruption widespread? 
Rule of Law  How strong is the judicial system? 
 Does unlawful state violence exist? 
 Does civilian power control security 
forces? 
 Does organized crime undermine the 
country’s stability? 
Respect for Fundamental Rights  Are civil and political freedoms 
respected? 
 Are religious and cultural rights 
respected? 
 Are other basic human rights respected? 
Civil society and Media  Can civil society operate freely and 
efficiently? 
 How independent and professional are the 
media? 
Relations between Communities and Dispute-
Solving Mechanisms 
 How good are relations between identity 
groups? 
 Does the state arbitrate over tensions and 
disputes between communities? 
 Are there uncontrolled flows of 
migrates/refugees? 
  
Sound Economic Management  How robust is the economy? 
 Is policy framework conductive to macro-
economic stability? 
 How sustainable is the state’s 
environmental policy? 
Social and Regional Inequalities  How are welfare policies addressed? 
 How are social inequalities tackled? 
 How are regional disparities tackled? 
Geopolitical Situation  How stable is the regional geopolitical 
situation? 
 Is the state affected by external threats? 
 Is the state affecting regional stability? 
 
Source: The European Union & Peacebuilding, The EU’s Role In peacebuilding, 
http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/bp-peacebuild1-eurole-en-nov-






Chapter III: Case Study Bosnia-Herzegovina 























Map 2: The Geographic Area of Former Yugoslavia (1989) and the Geographic 

















Table 3.A: The Change in Population Figures In Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 1991 Census Estimates November 1995 
 Serbs Croats Muslims Total Serbs Croats Muslims Total 









Zenica 79,355 169,657 328,644 577,656 16,000 115,000 439,000 570,000 
Tuzla 82,235 38,789 316,000 437,024 15,000 19,000 659,000 
[629,000] 
693,000 
Sarajevo 157,526 35,867 259,085 432,478 n/a n/a n/a 455,000 
















Total 1,340,966 717,600 1,655,300 3,972,692 1,206,000(- 
Sarajevo) 
470,000 1,497,000 3,628,000 
 
Notes: Figures in square brackets show numbers in November 1994 
² This figure refers to both Croat and Muslim communities. 




Source: (Kaldor, 2012: 55) 
From the table above, one can identify how each community’s population numbers were 
affected during the war. Moreover, we can see that the total population was lowered 
from 3,972,692 to 3,628,000. The community which showed the most significant total 
decrease was the Croats, from 717,600 to 470,000. Another population figure worth 
noting is the total population from Tuzla, which increases significantly from 437,024 to 
693,000: as previously mentioned, Tuzla managed to retain some state foundations that 
helped sustain itself and its population during the war. Although this table does not offer 
deeper information on the reasons behind the increase or decrease in the presence of 
communities in each place, and like any source, the numerical information has its 
limitations, the table does illustrate how the conflict affected population figures. 
Furthermore, it serves as an example of how “new wars” have an impact on 
communities and deeply alter population figures.  














Table 3.B:  Nation in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores from 2003 to 2012 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Electoral 
Process 
3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Civil Society 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.70 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Independent 
Media 
4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 













5.00 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 
Corruption 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
Democracy 
Score 
4.54 4.29 4.18 4.07 4.04 4.11 4.18 4.25 4.32 4.36 
 
Notes: The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of 
democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The nations-in-transit ratings reflect the period 
from January 1 through December 31 of the year preceding publication. 
Source: Freedom House 
Table 3.B highlights that civil society remains weak, with slow progress and how slow 




gradually done better in some areas, the change in ratings is not drastic. The electoral 
process and civil society show slow improvements, but the independent media seems to 
have slightly worse ratings. From 2003 to 2012, the democracy score went from 4.54 to 
4.36, which is fairly disappointing. This table illustrates how “new wars” have long-
lasting effects, and because the conflicts have their roots in problems of governance, 
two key components of dealing with “new wars” and preventing old conflicts from re-
starting are the rebuilding of society, and dealing with structural government problems.  
Solving “new wars” is about more than ending violence; it is about rebuilding society.  












Note: Graph 3.C shows how the democratic process is not always smooth, but a path 
filled with advances and retreats 
 
Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2012 Eurasia Findings: Overall Democracy Scores, (online) 


















Note: The NIT ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest 
level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The NIT ratings reflect the period from 
January 1 through December 31 of the year preceding publication. In NIT 2004, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo started to be examined in separate reports; in previous 
editions, ratings were for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Graph 3.D shows how Bosnia is categorized as having a transitional government and a 
hybrid regime, in part due to the elements of shared sovereignty with international 
forces. 
Source: Freedom House: Pinna, Alessandra, A Democratic Scorecard for the Western Balkans, (online) 




















Source: ( Senghaas, 2004: 6) 
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Europe & the Newly Independent States,(online) Edited by Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Aili Piano, 
Freedom House, Transaction Publishers, 2001, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacn550.pdf retrieved on 29/12/2013 
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